

United States District Court
Southern District of Texas

FILED

AUG 03 2016

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION

David J. Bradley, Clerk of Court

CANDACE LOUISE CURTIS
Plaintiff,

§
§
§
§
§
§
§

v

Civil Action No. 4:12-cv-00592

ANITA KAY BRUNSTING, et al
Defendants

**PLAINTIFF CANDACE LOUISE CURTIS’
MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM ORDER PURSUANT TO FED. R. CIV. P.
60(b)(3), FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(6) AND FED. R. CIV. P. 60(d)(3)**

CONTENTS

MOTION FOR RELIEF 2

I. GROUND FOR PETITION 3

II. JURISDICTION AND STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS 4

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 5

IV. NATURE AND STAGE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 6

V. THE PROCEEDINGS ARE IN STASIS BY DESIGN 8

VI. IN THE HARRIS COUNTY PROBATE COURT 10

VII. VACANCY IN THE OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATOR 12

VIII. THE PENDING DISPOSITIVE MOTIONS 12

IX. THE FIRST COLLUSION 13

X. SCHEME AND ARTIFICE TO DEFRAUD 14

 Transcript March 9, 2016 16

XI. THESE DISCUSSIONS WERE HIGHLY IMPROPER 19

 Transcript of March 9, 2016 Page 15 lines 16-21: 20

XII. FRAUD UPON PLAINTIFF AND THIS COURT 20

XIII. REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE 22

XIV. CONCLUSION 24

Cases

Barlow v. Colgate Palmolive Co. 772 F.3d 1001, 1010 (4th Cir. 2014) 4

Statutes

18 U.S.C. §§1341 12
18 U.S.C. §1951(b) 11
18 U.S.C. §2 11
18 U.S.C. §2511 12
28 U.S.C. §1447(d) 4
Tex. Ev. Cd. §§1002, 1003 15
Texas Penal Code §16.02 12
Texas Penal Codes §§31.02 & 31.03 11

Rules

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 60(b) Throughout
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) 5

MOTION FOR RELIEF

1. Plaintiff Candace Louise Curtis (Curtis) respectfully moves this honorable Court, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(3), Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6), and Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(d)(3), praying for relief from this Court’s order of July 22, 2014, approving Jason Ostrom’s Motion for leave to file an amended complaint and Order to Remand the above captioned matter to Harris County Probate Court No. 4¹.

¹ Document Nos. 107, 111 and 112 in this Court’s Record

2. This Motion relates to intentional misrepresentations made by Counsel before this Court, in effort to secure a remand to state court, as revealed by conduct in state court after that relief was granted.

I. GROUND FOR PETITION

3. The above captioned matter was remanded from this Court to the Harris County Probate Court pursuant to a stipulation between the parties, accepted and approved by this Honorable Court.² That stipulation involved Plaintiff amending her complaint to pollute diversity in order to facilitate a remand and, in return, Defendants agreed the federal injunction and all orders of this Court would remain in full force and effect as if there had been no remand. (Exhibit 1: E1-E4)

4. Counsel represented to this Court that the purpose for the remand was to afford complete relief to the parties. Conduct by Defendants, the attorneys, and the state Court manifest the exact opposite intentions. Once in the state probate Court, Defendants immediately ignored this Court's rulings and the injunction, as if the injunction had never been issued, and now act as if the matter had never been before this honorable Court at all.

5. Defendants perpetrated a fraud upon this Court and upon Petitioner, in that they had no intentions of honoring the remand agreement, but promised to do so for the purposes of evading this Court's judgments and orders, thereby depriving Plaintiff of a legitimate judicial forum.

²Harris County Probate Court No. 4, case: 412249, 412249-401, 412249-402 6/6/2014 order granting Plaintiff's motion to remand, signed May 15, 2014 PBT-2014-188311

II. JURISDICTION AND STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS

6. 28 U.S.C. §1447(d) does not prevent a district court from vacating a remand order that was obtained through fraud or misrepresentation.³ The circumstances in which an order may be vacated pursuant to Rule 60(b) are as reasonably applied to remand orders as to any other orders procured by fraud.

7. Vacatur in this case would not be adverse to the goals of §1447(d) and would preserve the integrity of federal judicial proceedings.

8. A federal Court has inherent jurisdiction to vindicate its dignity and authority and such power has been held to be organic, requiring neither statute nor rule for its invocation.

9. This Court specifically retained jurisdiction to enforce the remand agreement, as reflected in the remand order.

10. The twelve month statute of limitations applicable to F.R.C.P. Rule 60(b)(3) does not apply in this case, as this Court retained jurisdiction through the end of the controversy between these parties by stipulation, as reflected in the Remand Order.

11. Even without the Court's order for continuing jurisdiction there is no statute of limitations applicable to F.R.C.P. Rule 60(b)(6) and 60(d)(3) relief, as those statute sections follow the general law of voids.

12. Fraud vitiates everything it touches and a judgement or order procured by intentional deception is recognized by these rules as void ab initio.

³Barlow v. Colgate Palmolive Co. 772 F.3d 1001, 1010 (4th Cir. 2014) (en banc).

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

13. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) allows a party to seek relief from a final judgment for "(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect . . . or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of judgment."

14. Motions filed under subsection (1), (2) or (3) must be made "no more than a year after the entry of the judgment or order or the date of the proceeding" from which relief is sought, while those filed under subsection (6) must instead be made "within a reasonable time". (Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1))

15. The standard of review on orders granting or denying Rule 60(b) relief is abuse of discretion. For findings of fact the standard of review is clear error⁴ and for conclusions of law the standard for review is de novo.

16. Rule 60 motions should only be granted where (i) extraordinary circumstances exist and (ii) there is a showing that justice demands it.

17. Plaintiff is not a disgruntled litigant against whom adverse judgements have been entered. Plaintiff is a litigant whose motions cannot be answered by the Defendants or ruled against by the Court without reversal on appeal. Plaintiff is a litigant against whom the probate Court and the attorney officers of that Court have conspired against in effort to cheat justice and that is a matter of record.

18. A Motion under Rule 60(b)(6) brought within 120 days of obtaining proof of a fraud upon the federal Court is timely and the facts supporting this motion epitomize the very concept of extraordinary circumstances. Justice clearly demands vacatur as there is no other

⁴ Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a)

remedy available to Plaintiff within the context of this lawsuit and equity will not suffer a right to go without remedy.

19. Plaintiff seeks an honest judicial forum in which to pursue her claim of right, nothing more and nothing less.

IV. NATURE AND STAGE OF THE PROCEEDINGS

20. Plaintiff Curtis filed a Pro se Petition in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, Houston Division, on February 27, 2012, claiming breach of fiduciary, seeking disclosures and a full, true, complete accounting.

21. On March 6, 2012 Vacek & Freed staff attorney Bernard Mathews, appearing under the letterhead "Green and Mathews", filed a motion for an emergency order accompanied by a false affidavit signed and verified by Defendant Amy Brunsting. (Exhibit 18: E1249-E1251)

22. In reliance upon the material misrepresentations contained therein, on March 8, 2012, this Honorable Court dismissed Plaintiff Curtis' Pro se Petition sua sponte under the probate exception to federal diversity jurisdiction. Plaintiff Curtis filed a timely notice of appeal.

23. On April 2, 2012 Vacek & Freed filed the Will of Elmer Brunsting [#412248] and a purported Will for Nelva Brunsting [#412249] with the Harris County Clerk at the insistence of Carl Brunsting's attorney Bobbie Bayless.

24. On March 9, 2012 Carl Brunsting, individually and on behalf of the estate of Nelva Brunsting, filed a petition to take depositions before suit in the Harris County District Court.

25. On January 9, 2013 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in a unanimous decision reversed and remanded to this Court.⁵ Plaintiff Curtis immediately filed for a protective order.

⁵ Candace Curtis v Anita Brunsting et al., 710 F.3d 406

26. On January 29, 2013 Carl Brunsting filed suit against trust attorney Candace Kunz-Freed and Vacek & Freed P.L.L.C. in the Harris County District Court, as Executor of the estate of Nelva Brunsting.

27. On April 9, 2013 this Honorable Court issued a protective order enjoining Defendants Amy and Anita Brunsting from spending trust funds or liquidating trust assets without the Court's approval. (Exhibit 2: E5-E9)

28. Also on April 9, 2013 Carl Brunsting filed suit against Amy, Anita and Carole Brunsting in Harris County Probate Court No. 4, individually (412249-401) and as executor of the estate of Nelva Brunsting (412249).

29. Carl Brunsting's attorney, Bobbie Bayless, filed estate claims in the Harris County District Court against Candace Freed and Vacek & Freed P.L.L.C. alleging conspiracies involving Anita, Carole and Amy Brunsting, and then filed suit against Anita, Carole and Amy Brunsting in the Harris County Probate Court alleging a conspiracy involving Candace Freed. Not only did Bayless file claims against co-conspirators in separate Courts, she named federal Plaintiff Curtis a nominal defendant in her probate Court complaint.

30. Hearing on Plaintiff Curtis' Application for Order to Show Cause in the federal Court was held on or about October 2, 2013, however, due to a medical emergency Plaintiff Curtis' assistant was hospitalized in a coma and Plaintiff was unable to obtain the briefing materials before the hearing. Plaintiff was attempting to compel Defendants to bring forth the archetype of an instrument referred to as the "Qualified Beneficiary Designation and Testamentary Power of Appointment under Living Trust Agreement", allegedly signed by Nelva Brunsting on 8/25/2010 (Hereinafter the 8/25/2010 QBD). (Exhibit 4: E11-E19)

31. This instrument is the subject of Defendants' pending no-evidence Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, which Defendants removed from calendar after Plaintiff Curtis filed answer with Motion and demand to produce evidence. Defendants continue to use the instrument to threaten the Plaintiffs while perpetually refusing to produce it and qualify the alleged instrument as evidence. The 8/25/2010 QBD instrument is of dubious origin and doubtful validity, but plays very prominently in Defendants' disingenuous posturing as hereinafter more fully appears.

32. At the hearing October 2, 2013 this Court expressed concern over Plaintiff's lack of preparation and directed Pro se Plaintiff Curtis to retain counsel so that the discovery process could proceed. Plaintiff Curtis had difficulty finding counsel within the Court's time frame and had the misfortune of retaining Jason Ostrom.

33. Upon appearing in the matter Mr. Ostrom conceived of an arrangement by which Defendants agreed to modification of Plaintiff's Petition to include her brother Carl Henry Brunsting, thus polluting diversity and facilitating a remand to the Harris County Probate Court.

34. In exchange, Defendants agreed to abide by the federal injunction and all orders of the federal Court and on that basis the Court approved the amended complaint and entered an order for remand to the Harris County Probate Court. (Exhibit 3: E10)

V. THE PROCEEDINGS ARE IN STASIS BY DESIGN

35. Curtis v Brunsting is a lawsuit related only to the Brunsting Trusts.

36. There is no docket control order and no trial date in place in the trust litigation or in any related matter pending in the state courts. (Exhibit 19: E1252-E1253)

37. The office of Executor for the estate is vacant and the probate of the estate is the only claim the probate Court has to jurisdiction over the Brunsting trust litigation.

38. Defendant co-conspirators, Attorneys Vacek & Freed, are sequestered in the District Court, where there is no plaintiff, and the probate Court has refused to join the suits.

39. The Defendants' attorneys and Plaintiff Brunsting's attorney have scheduled summary judgment hearings and un-scheduled those hearings, but Curtis cannot get a hearing set on dispositive motions in that Court.

40. The probate Court has clearly colluded with the lawyers to validate the 8/25/2010 QBD without an evidentiary hearing, to create delay, to avoid evidentiary hearings, to exacerbate Plaintiff's costs and to apply Hobbs Act pressure. There is a clear "stream of benefits" at play here.

41. There is no current or proper accounting and no balance sheet has ever been produced.

42. Other than an Order modifying the federal injunction, in the two years this case has been in Harris County Probate Court No. 4 there have been no evidentiary hearings and no orders or judgements have been entered on the record.

43. Rather than set dispositive motions for hearing on Plaintiff Curtis' request, Plaintiff was ordered to a second mediation, with Defendants who have established an intractable record of having no intentions of honoring any legal or moral obligations.

44. Neither the lawyers nor the probate Court will make a distinction between the trust and the estate.

45. Resolution of the litigation and distributions from the trust are being held hostage to the payment of attorneys' fees in direct defiance of this Court's express orders and the purposes for the trust.

46. Defendants absolutely refuse to deposit income into an appropriate account for the beneficiary as ordered by this Court's injunction and continue to flaunt the law in their effort to game the judicial process as hereinafter more fully appears.

VI. IN THE HARRIS COUNTY PROBATE COURT

47. Upon remand to the Harris County Probate Court, Defendants' Counsel filed a motion to modify the injunction to allow Defendants to pay the quarterly and annual taxes without the expense of petitioning the Court each time and a limited modification was granted relating only to payment of taxes and associated professional fees.

48. Jason Ostrom agreed to provide Plaintiff Curtis with a review of documents before they were filed, but did not communicate before, or even copy her after pleadings were filed. Plaintiff was forced to data mine to try to discover what was happening in the probate Court and received much of her information via email from Carl Brunsting.

49. The five Brunsting siblings then attended a mediation that ended with no prospect for resolution. Immediately thereafter, Defendants' attorneys with Mills Shirley filed a petition to be relieved as counsel of record, citing to non-specific conflicts of interest.

50. Then, without conferring and having never submitted a single invoice to Plaintiff Curtis, Jason Ostrom filed application for a distribution of \$25,000 from the trust to pay his attorney fees and Carole Brunsting's attorney, Darlene Payne Smith, objected.

51. Ostrom then filed a second motion for a distribution of \$45,000, after discussion with Curtis, and both Anita and Carole objected.

52. Anita's new counsel, Brad Featherston, argued that the trust was not liable to pay the attorney creditors of the beneficiary. (Exhibit 20: E1254-E1409) Anita attached a "version" of the alleged 8/25/2010 QBD and a copy of the 2005 Restatement.

53. Carole's objection contained as an exhibit, a "true and correct copy" of the 8/25/2010 QBD. Three distinctly different true and correct copies of the one alleged 8/25/2010 QBD are now in the record bearing different signature page 37's, as the attached exhibit shows. (Exhibit 4: E11-E19)

54. Mr. Ostrom was repeatedly advised that complete consolidation with Carl Brunsting was not authorized or proper because of a conflict of interest with Carl Brunsting's Counsel, Bobbie Bayless.

55. Curtis was also emphatic that her mother did not lack capacity but discovered in her data mining that the cases had been consolidated upon a verbal motion made at a previous hearing and, without notice to or consent from Plaintiff Curtis, against direct and adamant insistence from Plaintiff Curtis that her mother was not incompetent, Jason Ostrom filed an amended complaint in the probate Court raising question as to the competency of a very lucid Nelva Brunsting.

56. Plaintiff Curtis then discovered, after the fact, that Mr. Ostrom, in total and absolute disregard for his instructions, had moved in secret to re-plead, consolidate and had again compromised Plaintiff's claims.

57. Not only did Ostrom attempt to dissolve the distinction between the trust and the estate by using the estate heading in his "amended complaint", the changes made by Ostrom are the only basis for Defendants' attorneys and the probate Court to threaten Plaintiff Curtis with disinheritance, using violation of the no contest provisions in the alleged 8/25/2010 QBD (the forged extortion instrument⁶).

⁶ In violation of 18 U.S.C. §1951(b) and 18 U.S.C. §2 and Texas Penal Codes §§31.02 & 31.03

58. Plaintiff Curtis immediately discharged Mr. Ostrom and resumed personal control of the litigation, but more than substantial damage had already been done by moving the matter to a corrupt Harris County Probate Court, as hereinafter more fully appears.

VII. VACANCY IN THE OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATOR

59. At a brutal deposition before trial in the District Court, Carl Brunsting was unable to answer questions, clearly having failed to fully recover from the encephalitis illness and coma that created the Defendants' opportunity for all of the untoward conduct that spawned the causes for this litigation.

60. Carl thereafter resigned as executor on February 2, 2015, leaving the office vacant. The office remains vacant.

61. Defendants in the District Court, Vacek & Freed, immediately filed a motion for summary judgment citing Carl's disability as the equivalent of no evidence.

VIII. THE PENDING DISPOSITIVE MOTIONS

62. On June 26, 2015 Defendants' new attorneys in Probate Court No. 4 filed a No-Evidence Motion for Partial Summary Judgment claiming that there is no evidence that the 8/25/2010 QBD is invalid. (Exhibit 5: E20-E28)

63. On or about July 1, 2015 Defendants disseminated a CD containing illegally obtained wiretap recordings⁷ which were received by Plaintiff Curtis from Anita's counsel, Brad Featherston, via certified mail with signature required.

64. July 7, 2015 Carl Brunsting filed a Motion for Protective Order regarding the illegally obtained wiretap recordings. (Exhibit 8: E343-E393)

⁷ It should be noted that this conduct violates Texas Penal Code §16.02 and 18 U.S.C. §§1341, 2511 and constitutes predicate acts.

65. On July 9, 2015 Carl Brunsting filed a motion for partial summary judgment focusing on improper financial transactions, but did not respond to Defendants' no-evidence motion. (Exhibit 6: E29-E288)

66. On July 13, 2015 Attorneys for Plaintiff Carl Brunsting and the Defendants filed notices setting hearing on their dispositive motions for August 3, 2015. (Exhibit 10: E404-E405)

67. Also on July 13, 2015 Plaintiff Curtis filed an answer to Defendants' no-evidence motion, with a motion and demand to produce evidence, demanding Defendants produce the archetype of the alleged 8/25/2010 QBD and qualify it as evidence. Defendants cannot produce the forged 8/25/2010 QBD instrument and qualify it as evidence and have steadfastly refused to do so for more than four years. (Exhibits 4: E11-E19 and 11: E406-E452)

IX. THE FIRST COLLUSION

68. On July 22, 2015, while Plaintiff Curtis was in flight home to California, Carl Brunsting's counsel, Bobbie Bayless, arranged with Defendants' counsel to remove the summary judgment and demand to produce evidence motions from the August 3, 2015 calendar to hear an emergency motion for protective orders regarding the wiretap recordings.

69. The August 3, 2015 hearing thus became a hearing on the motion for a protective order to prevent further dissemination of the illegal wiretap recordings. (Exhibit 12: E453-E494)

70. On January 14, 2016 Temporary Administrator Gregory Lester filed a fabricated report to the court, and rather than confine himself to evaluating the merits of the estate's claims he took it upon himself to trespass on the individual litigation brought by Carl and Candace as beneficiaries of the Brunsting trusts. (Exhibit 9: E394-E403)

71. The "Report" attempts to legitimize all of Defendants' misapplications of fiduciary, attempts to legitimize Defendants' baseless claims, and relies heavily on the forged 8/25/2010 QBD, specifically referring to the "no contest clause" concluding that, if the Court ruled on the no contest clause Carl and Candace would "take nothing" and suggesting mediation to resolve the pending lawsuits.

72. In essence, the Gregory Lester report concludes that the estate's claims have no merit. If true, the probate Court would have no claim to jurisdiction over the inter vivos trust litigation. In point of fact the report of Temporary Administrator Gregory Lester is fraudulent and cannot be supported under the law of the trust, the record of the various lawsuits, the common law, or the trust code.

73. On January 25, 2016 Plaintiff Curtis filed a motion for summary judgment (Exhibit 14: E497-E1187) and emailed a request for setting to Judge Comstock asking to have all the dispositive motions set for hearing. (Exhibit 15: E1188)

74. Curtis' Motion also contains petitions for declaratory judgement regarding illicit instruments drafted by Candace Freed and used by Anita Brunsting to commit fraud.

75. As a necessary consideration to hearing of the declaratory judgment motions, Plaintiff Curtis also filed a separate motion to transfer the District Court case to probate Court No. 4, so that Defendant Candace Freed could defend her works and all of the accused co-conspirators would be in the same Court.

76. The Court set a hearing for March 9, 2016 to hear the transfer motion and for a status conference.

X. SCHEME AND ARTIFICE TO DEFRAUD

77. Remand to state Court May 2014.

78. September 2014 Mills Shirley withdrew as counsel for Amy and Anita Brunsting.

79. February 2, 2015 Carl Brunsting resigned as executor of the estate, leaving the office vacant.

80. Plaintiff Curtis terminated the services of Jason Ostrom March 24, 2015.

81. On July 21, 2015 a hearing was held regarding the vacancy of the office of executor. Defendant Amy Brunsting and Plaintiff Candace Curtis are the next listed successor executors, but to avoid argument the parties agreed to the appointment of one Greg Lester, previously unknown to Plaintiff and recommended by the court, as an “independent” temporary administrator for the limited purpose of evaluating the estate claims.

82. On July 22, 2015, while Curtis was inflight home to California, the hearings on the dispositive motions and Curtis’ Demand to Produce Evidence (Tex. Ev. Cd. §§1002, 1003) of the 8/25/2010 QBD were removed from calendar without notice to, or consent from, Plaintiff Curtis.

83. The August 3, 2015 hearing thus became a hearing on Carl Brunsting’s **emergency** motion for a protective order regarding illegal wiretap recordings that had been disseminated in July 2015. (Exhibit 12: E453-E494)

84. On September 1, 2015 Temporary Administrator Greg Lester filed an application to retain counsel to assist him with his duties to the estate.

85. Hearing was set on Gregory Lester’s Motion for September 10, 2015 and no transcript of that hearing has been made available. (Exhibit 13: E495-E496)

86. A March 9, 2016 status conference was scheduled on Curtis request to set the dispositive motions for hearing and on Curtis’ application to snatch the district Court case.

87. At the March 9, 2016 status/setting conference Attorney Neal Spielman makes numerous disingenuous statements in opposition to Curtis' request to set the pending motions for summary judgement, but then he says things that are as revealing as they are troubling. (emphasis added for easy reference):

Transcript March 9, 2016

88. Page 12 beginning at line 22 (Exhibit 16: E1200)

MR. SPIELMAN : We all, collectively, the parties and their counsel at the time, we all agreed to Mr . Lester taking the role that he was taking. And Ms. Curtis, herself, I believe, on the record, spoke of having done her due diligence into every person that was suggested by any attorney that was in this room to serve in Mr. Lester's role, and it was Ms. Curtis' opinion that only Mr. Lester can serve in that role

We all, as attorneys or as pro se parties, agreed that what the function that was designated to Mr. Lester was important, was necessary, and that we were going to live by and abide by the report that he wrote.

The problem that I see right now, and one of the reasons I suspect why Mr. Mendel suggested that we go to mediation is in deference to and with respect for what Mr. Lester said in his report and what he seems to be trying to suggest to the parties as to what the future of this lawsuit might hold.

I think that what we're seeing now is an effort to backtrack from the direction that Mr. Lester tried to set us on and some of the conclusions or recommendations that he made as to what some of these claims, particularly the ones that Ms. Curtis is attempting to bring forward in summary judgment, are going to actually look like.

I think the effort to backtrack from what Mr. Lester was instructed to do/ordered to do and what he did, in retrospect, you have to wonder what was the point of even having done that if the parties, or a party, is now going to try to back away from the impact of what that was done?

89. At Page 14 (E1203) beginning at Line 3 Spielman makes a revealing and disturbing statement indicating additional collusions:

One of the reasons we thought that mediation, like Mr. Lester suggested that mediation might work, is that the right mediator, he talked to talked about the idea of using a former judge -I think we talked about that in the courtroom last time -that the right mediator might help to explain, to educate, to unentrench anybody -whether that be me, whether that be Mr. Mendel, whether that be Ms.

Bayless, whether that be Ms. Brunsting, Ms. Curtis, whomever. I think Mr. Lester saw the wisdom in mediation. I think we see the wisdom in mediation. But the consternation or the concern at this point, again, is this issue that Ms. Curtis seems to be unwilling to appreciate, adapt, recognize, embrace what Mr. Lester concluded or recommended in his report; and if that's the case, then I wonder if, if spending the money that it takes to go to mediation makes sense.

Frankly, Judge, the most interesting thing that I heard Ms. Curtis say was on the issue of attorneys fees and that that doesn't matter to her; and that is exactly part of the point. I think you were in the courtroom, Judge, the last time when Carole Brunsting made a very impassioned plea or explanation to the Court about how Ms. Curtis' pro se status and her, her need to be a lawyer and her failure to appreciate what it costs, what the costs of this lawsuit are, is never going to lead to this being resolved. lost my train of thought there for a second. I may have But the point here, Judge, is there seems to be no accountability on Ms. Curtis' behalf for the amount of money that is being spent in this case. Parties have, in the past, suggested, oh, let's not worry about the attorneys fees because that will all even out at the end of the story when everybody decides to divide by five, the corpus of the trust, and the winning parties or the prevailing parties can everything can be adjusted through the division of that estate. But, Your Honor, if you look at what Mr. Lester recommended/suggested/reported in his report, there's now the very real possibility that there isn't going to be a divide-by-five scenario because of the no-contest clauses that are recognized as being properly drawn by the Vacek & Freed Law Firm. And if that happens, Judge, then the trust is now spending its own money from those people, whether it be three or four, that are still going to get a portion of the estate, a portion of the trust proceeds when this is all said and done.

I'm rambling just a bit only because it's such a circular discussion -is how do we get this case finished given given the backtracking from everybody's willingness to vest Mr. Lester with the authority to proceed/ and now the one person who doesn't like what he said, after she filed motions for summary judgment that are direct contradiction to the conclusions that he reached. The very constant of having to come down here and respond to those to those motions for summary judgment the amount of money that that will waste is insulting, is offensive to the parties.

I'd love to come up with a creative idea to create some accountability/ perhaps, if it comes in the form of a sanction or perhaps it comes in the form of some kind of bond being posted so that if it turns out that one of the parties who is blowing things up as it were and creating this increased attorneys fees no longer has an interest in the estate with which we can even that out by the end of the day. Perhaps if Ms. Curtis is ordered to post a bond against her claims or to protect against the ability --our ability to recover fees from her if, as and when she loses her case perhaps then we can move forward with additional hearings additional motions and so forth.

Keep in mind, Judge, that it's not simply --it's not as simple as getting a date for Ms. Curtis' summary judgment motions. There's been no discovery, in terms of depositions done in this case, not the least of which will be depositions from, perhaps, even from the lawyers in the other district court case who drafted the documents that can explain what all went into those documents, what Nelva Brunsting's state of mind was at the time. There's no way to respond to those summary judgment motions right now without the full weight of the discovery process moving forward and all of the money that that's going to cost.

91. These claims are in direct opposition to the claims Defendants made in their No-evidence Motion. In Defendants' June 25, 2015 No-Evidence Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at page 1 item I (E20):

I. Summary of the Argument

This litigation started more than thirty-eight (38) months ago. Plaintiffs had sufficient time for discovery in this suit and the three (3) other actions related to the 8/25/10 QBD (defined below). Plaintiffs challenge the 8/25/10 QBD on the following grounds, for which there is no evidence:

foot note:

1 Those three other proceedings are: (1) No. 4:12-CV-00592; Candace Louise Curtis v. Anita Kay Brunsting; United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, Houston Division; (2) CA No, 2012-14538; In re Carl Brunsting (202 Petition); 80TH Judicial District Court of Harris County, TX; and (3) CA No. 2013-05455; Carl Henry Brunsting v. Candace Freed & Vacek & Freed; 164TH Judicial District Court of Harris County, TX.

92. However, the most disturbing thing in Mr. Spielman's diatribe were the references to dialogs at a previous hearing involving Mr. Lester, when there was no previous hearing involving Mr. Lester where these matters were properly before the Court.

One of the reasons we thought that mediation, like Mr. Lester suggested that mediation might work, is that the right mediator, he talked to talked about the idea of using a former judge -I think we talked about that in the courtroom last time -that the right mediator might help to explain, to educate, to unentrench anybody -

... I think you were in the courtroom, Judge, the last time when Carole Brunsting made a very impassioned plea or explanation to the Court about how Ms. Curtis' pro se status and her, her need to be a lawyer and her failure to appreciate what it costs, what the costs of this lawsuit are, is never going to lead to this being resolved

XI. THESE DISCUSSIONS WERE HIGHLY IMPROPER

93. Plaintiff Curtis is an heir and an interested person but not a party to the estate litigation.

94. Candace Louise Curtis v Anita Brunsting et al., (Curtis v Brunsting) was filed in the federal Court fourteen months prior to the first estate claims and having survived dismissal under the Probate Exception to federal diversity jurisdiction, it is inarguably established that Curtis v Brunsting is not connected to the probate of the estate (Exhibit 17: E1243-E1248) and is not subject to probate administration.

95. The only hearing that involved Greg Lester prior to March 9, 2016 was the September 10, 2015 hearing on Greg Lester's September 1, 2015 application to retain counsel to assist him in his fiduciary duties to the estate.

96. The only matter properly before the court on September 10, 2015 was whether or not Mr. Lester should have the authority to retain Jill Willard Young to assist him in his administration obligations to the estate.

97. Neither individual Plaintiff Candace Curtis nor individual Plaintiff Carl Brunsting was in attendance September 10, 2015, as neither is party to the estate litigation and neither objected to Mr. Lester retaining Jill Young to assist with his fiduciary duty to evaluate the estate's claims. That was the only issue properly before the Court on September 10, 2015 and did not include the matters Mr. Spielman states were discussed and where there was apparently an agreement made to treat the Gregory Lester report as if it were a jury verdict before it was even written.

98. Plaintiff has been unsuccessful in attempts to obtain a transcript of this September 10, 2015 hearing.

99. The inescapable conclusion here is that there were improper discussions outside of the presence of the Plaintiffs who were prejudiced by those discussions, involving matters not properly before the Court, wherein there were agreements made between the Court, Jill Willard Young, Neal Spielman, Bradley Featherston, Stephen Mendel and Gregory Lester to produce a fictitious report. They all apparently agreed to follow the as of yet unwritten report as if it were factual, that the false report would be used to further the extortion plot, that mediation would be forced upon Plaintiffs, that the costs of litigation for Plaintiff Curtis would be exacerbated, that there would be extended delay and, that another crony had been hand selected to act first as mediator and then as arbiter. First to “unentrench” Plaintiff Curtis from her stand upon rights and reliance upon the rule of law in the face of this all too obvious public corruption conspiracy and second, to deprive Plaintiff of substantive due process and access to the Court.

100. Defendants continue to use the forged 8/25/2010 QBD (extortion instrument) to threaten Plaintiffs with disinheritance, going so far as to refer to the September 10, 2015 conspiracy for the proposition that the instrument has been held valid:

Transcript of March 9, 2016 Page 15 (E1203) lines 16-21:

But, Your Honor, if you look at what Mr. Lester recommended/suggested/reported in his report, there's now the very real possibility that there isn't going to be a divide-by - five scenario because of the no - contest clauses that are recognized as being properly drawn by the Vacek & Freed Law Firm.

XII. FRAUD UPON PLAINTIFF AND THIS COURT

101. After Defendants claimed there was no evidence the forged 8/25/2010 QBD was invalid, Defendants removed their no-evidence motion from calendar knowing they cannot answer Plaintiff Curtis’ demand to produce the thing, explain away the anomalies, and qualify it as evidence, and yet they continue to threaten Plaintiffs with the bogus instrument’s “no contest

clause” with the transparent collusion of involuntary Plaintiff Carl Brunsting’s Attorney and the probate Court.

102. The probate plan is thus, according to Mr. Spielman, to subject Plaintiffs to endless delay and expense until the Plaintiff victims agree to pay fee ransoms to the attorneys who are holding the beneficiaries’ property hostage.

103. Defendants have not willingly honored any agreements, not the trust agreement, not the remand agreement, and cannot be expected to honor any mediated settlement agreement.

104. Defendants knew when they agreed to honor the federal injunction and the Orders entered by this Court as a condition of the remand, that they had no intentions of honoring any legal or moral obligations. Defendants refuse to honor the federal injunction and the orders of this Court even after having promised to do so as a condition of the remand stipulation and Defendants’ own pleadings in the probate Court are conclusive evidence of the existence of that fact.

105. Defendants will not, because they cannot, bring forth the archetype of the 8/25/2010 QBD and qualify the thing as evidence. If they could answer Plaintiff Curtis’ Motion and Demand to Produce Evidence they certainly would have done so.

106. Instead, Defendants’ attorneys conspired with the Court to avoid evidentiary hearings knowing they cannot produce the forged 8/25/2010 QBD extortion instrument and qualify it as evidence, and continue to use it to threaten and intimidate Plaintiffs Curtis and Carl Brunsting.

107. Mr. Spielman confessed on March 9, 2016 that the attorneys conspired at the hearing on application to retain Jill Young, with the probate Court Judges, the Court’s crony administrator Gregory Lester, and Jill Young, entering into an illicit agreement to produce a

fictitious “report” and to subsequently treat the fiction as if it were the equivalent of a jury verdict, and this all occurred before the “Report” was even written.

108. Thus, after removing their no-evidence summary judgement motion from calendar knowing their precious 8/25/2010 QBD is a forgery and that they cannot produce the heinous thing and qualify it as evidence, Defendants’ attorneys none-the-less continued to use the no-contest clause ruse in the forged 8/25/2010 “extortion instrument”, to threaten and attempt to intimidate the Plaintiff victims, who they know full well are owed fiduciary obligations by these Defendants.

109. It is important to note that there are known trust assets that remain unaccounted for. For example, none of the quasi-accountings received from the Defendants reflect the accounts receivable for a \$100,000 loan Anita received from the trust in 1999.⁸

110. Moreover, an amendment to the 1996 trust dated April 30, 1999, disclosed by Vacek & Freed in the District Court lawsuit, specifically identifies the \$100,000 loan as an advance on Anita’s inheritance. That trust amendment was never disclosed by Anita Brunsting in the course of Curtis v Brunsting or the estate suits in the probate Court.

111. A covert letter to the Special Master dated July 15, 2015⁹ claims Nelva wanted to continue a history of gifting by paying off Amy and Carole’s homes as “she and her husband did the same for Anita in approximately 2005” (Exhibit 21: E1410-E1412) when the public record shows the loan occurred July 1, 1999.

XIII. REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

112. Plaintiff Curtis respectfully asks this Court to take Judicial Notice of her first amended complaint filed Pro se May 1, 2013. That amendment was rejected for filing because

⁸ Victoria County Clerk Official Records Instrument #199908618 dated July 1, 1999

⁹ Case 4:12-cv-00592 Document 67-1 Filed in TXSD on 08/27/13

Plaintiff Curtis failed to document her efforts to obtain Defendants' consent for the amended complaint. Plaintiff at that time was asking to amend her complaint to bring the matter under federal question jurisdiction based upon evidence obtained after the initial filing. The Jurisdictional Statement in that pre-Ostrom amendment to Curtis' complaint reads as follows:¹⁰

4. *This matter was originally brought in equity as breach of fiduciary and related equitable claims that included a common law tort claim under diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 USC §1332 (a) (1) - 28 USC §1332 (b) and 28 USC §1332 (C) (2). Plaintiff hereby incorporates those claims by reference as if fully restated herein, but with newly discovered evidence presents additional and alternate claims. Additionally, Plaintiff is informed and believes Defendants are not de jure trustees.*

5. *This complaint now alleges violations of the wire, mail and securities laws of the United States as expressed in Chapter 63 of Title 18 of the United States Code, and Plaintiff is seeking to pursue additional remedies under 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Exchange Act").*

6. *This court has federal question jurisdiction over the subject matter of this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§1331 and 1367 and Section 27 of the Exchange Act (15 U.S.C. §78aa) and exclusive jurisdiction over these claims as this action arises under Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act (15 U.S.C. §§78j(b) and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder (17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5) and the causes of action implied therefrom.*

7. *In connection with the acts and omissions alleged in this complaint, Defendants, directly or indirectly, used the means and instrumentalities of interstate commerce, including, but not limited to, the internet, the mails, interstate telephone communications, and the facilities of the national securities markets.*

113. Attorney Jason Ostrom represented to this Court that the purpose for a remand was to afford complete relief to the parties. When Mr. Ostrom made those representations he was well acquainted with the Harris County Probate Court and its officers, and knew full well there would be no remedy flowing from that Court for anyone but attorneys and court cronies.

114. Ostrom's true motivation for remand was apparently to obstruct justice in pursuit of attorney fees, not to provide any form of relief to the parties.

¹⁰ Document No. 48 in this Court's Record

115. Every attorney who has been involved in this case has tried to get the Brunsting Trust removed from an honorable federal Court to Harris County's Probate Court. The reasons at this juncture are crystal clear and have nothing to do with the honest administration of justice.

XIV. CONCLUSION

116. Both Plaintiffs' and Defendants' attorneys' intentional misrepresentations before this honorable Court, that the purpose for a remand was to provide complete relief to the parties, unfairly and unnecessarily polluted diversity to procure the Remand Orders, and in so doing deprived Plaintiff Curtis of a legitimate judicial forum to which she was and is entitled in this case.

117. Everyone involved in this case except Plaintiff Curtis has taken advantage of Carl Brunsting's illness, the Defendants, the Defendants' attorneys, the District Court Defendants and the probate Court.

118. There have been no evidentiary hearings and no rulings have been entered on any substantive issues in the probate Court. The Defendants are paying exorbitant trust income taxes due to the refusal to deposit income into an appropriate account for the beneficiary, as this honorable Court's injunction commands.

119. The attorneys have docketed and un-docketed motions for summary judgment but Plaintiff Curtis cannot buy a hearing, or a scheduling order or a trial date, or an accounting, or respect for the federal injunction, nor respect for any of her rights, and there appears to be no remedy for the parties to be found at the hands of the Harris County Probate Cartel.

120. If there is such a magical document as this 8/25/2010 QBD, that trumps federal injunctions and the Orders of a federal Judge, renders remand agreements nugatory, removes fiduciary obligations, forecloses beneficial interests, taints the blood of innocent remaindermen,

amends what can only be amended by a court of competent jurisdiction and revokes what can only be revoked by a court of competent jurisdiction, the Defendants and their attorneys should be brought before an honorable Court where they will actually be compelled to produce the supernatural thing and qualify it as evidence.

121. Wherefore Plaintiff Curtis respectfully requests that the Court vacate the order granting filing of the amended complaint¹¹ for fraud upon Plaintiff Curtis and upon this honorable Court, in the interest of justice pursuant to Rules 60(b)(3), (b)(6) and (d)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, voiding the subsequent Remand Order¹² as a matter of right, and restoring this case to this honorable Court's docket.

122. Wherefore Plaintiff Curtis further prays the Court issue the attached proposed order or issue its own orders upon such terms as the Court deems most beneficial to the purposes of Equity and Justice and most beneficial to the public policy considerations in upholding the dignity and authority of this Honorable Court.

Plaintiff/Petitioner so moves,

Petitioner hereby verifies, under penalty of perjury pursuant to the laws of the United States of America and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 11, that the above statements based upon personal knowledge are true and correct, and as to those things asserted on information and belief, affiant believes those things to be true as well.

[Signatures on the following page]

¹¹ Document No. 111 in this Courts record

¹² Document No. 112 in this Courts record

Respectfully submitted,



Candace Louise Curtis
218 Landana Street
American Canyon CA 94503
925-759-9020
occurtis@sbcglobal.net

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE


I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument has been sent on this 2ND day of July 2016, to the following via U.S.P.S. Priority Mail:

Attorneys for Anita Kay Brunsting

Stephen A. Mendel
The Mendel Law Firm, L.P.
1155 Dairy Ashford, Suite 104
Houston, Texas 77079
steve@mendellawfirm.com


Attorneys for Amy Ruth Brunsting:

Neal E. Spielman
Griffin & Matthews
1155 Dairy Ashford, Suite 300
Houston, Texas 77079
nspielman@grifmatlaw.com



CANDACE L. CURTIS

Respectfully submitted,



Candace Louise Curtis
218 Landana Street
American Canyon CA 94503
925-759-9020
occurtis@sbcglobal.net

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument has been sent on this 1st day of August 2016, to the following via U.S.P.S. Priority Mail:

Attorneys for Anita Kay Brunsting

Stephen A. Mendel
The Mendel Law Firm, L.P.
1155 Dairy Ashford, Suite 104
Houston, Texas 77079
steve@mendellawfirm.com

Attorneys for Amy Ruth Brunsting:

Neal E. Spielman
Griffin & Matthews
1155 Dairy Ashford, Suite 300
Houston, Texas 77079
nspielman@grifmatlaw.com



CANDACE L. CURTIS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION

CANDACE LOUISE CURTIS
Plaintiff,

v

ANITA KAY BRUNSTING, et al
Defendants

§
§
§
§
§
§
§

Civil Action No. 4:12-cv-00592

ORDER VACATING LEAVE TO FILE FIRST AMENDED PETITION

On this day, the Court considered Plaintiff's Petition for Vacatur of this Court's Order granting leave for Plaintiff to file a First Amended Petition. The Court, having considered the matter fully, is of the opinion and finds that Plaintiff's request to amend should have been denied. It is therefore, ORDERED that the Court's Order of 15th day May, 2014 granting leave for Plaintiff to file a First Amended Petition is hereby vacated.

It is so Ordered

SIGNED on this _____, 2016

Kenneth M. Hoyt United States District Judge