

IN THE ESTATE OF	§	PROBATE COURT
NELVA E. BRUNSTING	§	NUMBER FOUR (4)
DECEASED	§	HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS

REPORT OF TEMPORARY ADMINISTRATOR PENDING CONTEST

On July 24, 2015 an Order of this Court, signed by Judge Christine Butts on July 23, 2015, was filed in the above styled and numbered case. In this Order the Court stated that Greg Lester was appointed Temporary Administrator Pending Contest of this estate. The Court directed that Greg Lester will report to the Court regarding the merits of the claims in this case on or before the expiration of this Order. The Order will expire on or about January 20, 2016, which is 180 days after the date that the Order was signed.

BACKGROUND

The Brunsting Family

Nelva and Elmer Brunsting were married and had five (5) children: Candace Louise Curtis (“ Candace”), Carol Ann Brunsting (“ Carol”), Carl Henry Brunsting (“Carl”), Amy Ruth Tschirhart (“Amy”) and Anita Kay Riley (“Anita”).

The Brunsting Family Living Trust

Elmer Brunsting and Nelva Brunsting (herein referred to as “Settlors”) created the Brunsting Family Living Trust (the “Trust”) on October 10, 1996. The Trust was subsequently restated in its entirety on January 12, 2005. A copy of the Restatement of the Brunsting Family Living Trust (“Restatement”) is attached hereto as the first exhibit.

The Trust could be amended during the lifetime of the original Settlers. However, once a Settlor dies, the Trust could not be amended except by court order.

Each Settlor could provide for a different disposition of their share of the Trust by executing a qualified beneficiary designation for that person’s share alone.

Trustees of the Brunsting Family Living Trust

The initial trustees of the Trust were Elmer Brunsting and Nelva Brunsting. The Restatement provided that if both original Co-Trustees failed or ceased to serve, then Carl Henry Brunsting and Amy Ruth Tschirhart would serve as Co-Trustees.

Each original Trustee has the right to appoint successor trustees to serve in the event the original Trustee ceases to serve by death, disability, or for any reason, and may specify any conditions on the succession and service as may be permitted by law. The Restatement also provided that the original Trustees may each remove any trustee they have individually named as their respective successor.

On September 6, 2007, a First Amendment to the Restatement to the Brunsting Family Living Trust was executed by Settlers which changed the succession of successor trustees, a copy of which is attached hereto as the second exhibit. This document appointed Carl Henry Brunsting and Candace Louise Curtis as successor co-trustees if both original Trustees fail or cease to serve. If either Carl Henry Brunsting or Candace Louise Curtis should fail or cease to serve, then the remaining successor trustee would serve alone. If neither successor co-trustee is able or willing to serve, then The Frost National Bank shall serve as the sole successor trustee. The First Amendment effectively removed Amy Ruth Tschirhart as the successor co-trustee and substituted Candace Louise Curtis in her place and stead.

Elmer Brunsting died on April 1, 2009, and after her husband's death, Nelva Brunsting served alone as the original trustee.

On December 21, 2010, Nelva Brunsting exercised her right to designate a successor trustee. Nelva Brunsting executed an Appointment of Successor Trustee, a copy of which is attached hereto as the third exhibit. The Appointment of Successor Trustee stated that if Nelva Brunsting resigned as Trustee, then Anita Kay Brunsting would serve as successor trustee, Amy Ruth Tschirhart would serve as the second successor, and The Frost National Bank as the third successor. If Nelva Brunsting fails or ceases to serve as trustee because of her death or disability, then Anita Kay Brunsting and Amy Ruth Tschirhart would serve as successor co-trustees.

On the same date, on December 21, 2010, Nelva Brunsting also exercised her right to resign as Trustee. Specifically, Nelva Brunsting resigned as Trustee of the Trust, the Nelva Brunsting Survivor's Trust and Elmer Brunsting's Decedent's Trust and appointed Anita Kay Brunsting as trustee of the aforementioned Trusts.

Split of Brunsting Family Living Trust into the Survivor's Trust and the Decedent's Trust

After Elmer Brunsting's death on April 1, 2009, the Trust split into two trusts—the Nelva Brunsting Survivor's Trust (the "Survivor's Trust") and the Elmer Brunsting Decedent's Trust

(the “Decedent’s Trust”). Nelva Brunsting, as the original Trustee, served as Trustee over both the Survivor’s and Decedent’s Trusts.

There is no power of appointment related to the Trust which was exercised by Elmer Brunsting prior to his death on April 1, 2009.

Pursuant to the Restatement, the beneficiary of the Survivor’s Trust, Nelva Brunsting, had an unlimited and unrestricted general power of appointment over the entire principal and any accrued but undistributed income of the Survivor’s Trust. This general power of appointment was very broad, and granted the survivor the power to appoint the Survivor’s Trust to anyone, outright or in trust, in equal or unequal proportions.

The Decedent’s Trust would terminate at the surviving Settlor’s death or on the death of Nelva Brunsting. Pursuant to the Restatement, the survivor had a limited testamentary power of appointment to appoint the undistributed principal and income to the descendants of the Settlers only. While Nelva Brunsting (as the surviving Settlor) was restricted to only appointing the assets to her descendants, the assets of the Decedent’s Trust could be appointed by Nelva Brunsting (as the surviving Settlor) to her descendants in any proportion and on terms and conditions as the survivor elects.

Nelva Brunsting’s June 15, 2010 Qualified Beneficiary Designation and Exercise of Power of Appointment

On June 15, 2010, Nelva Brunsting executed a Qualified Beneficiary Designation and Exercise of Power of Appointment under Living Trust Agreement, a copy of which is attached hereto as the fourth exhibit. This document exercised Nelva Brunsting’s general power of appointment over the Survivor’s Trust and her limited power of appointment over the Decedent’s Trust.

Specifically, Nelva Brunsting’s exercise appointed the Survivor’s Trust and Decedent’s Trust to be distributed equally among Nelva and Elmer Brunsting’s five (5) children: Candace Louise Curtis, Carol Ann Brunsting, Carl Henry Brunsting, Amy Ruth Tschirhart and Anita Kay Riley. This document also expressed Nelva Brunsting’s intent that upon the death of Nelva Brunsting, any funds advanced to Nelva Brunsting’s descendants would be deducted from that particular descendant’s share of assets received from the Survivor’s Trust and Decedent’s Trust.

Nelva Brunsting’s August 25, 2010 Qualified Beneficiary Designation and Exercise of Power of Appointment

On August 25, 2010, Nelva Brunsting executed a Qualified Beneficiary Designation and Exercise of Testamentary Power of Appointment under Living Trust Agreement, a copy of which is attached hereto as the fifth exhibit. This document appears to have superseded the June 15,

2010 Qualified Beneficiary Designation and Exercise of Power of Appointment under Living Trust Agreement.

In this document, Nelva Brunsting exercised her general power of appointment over the Survivor's Trust and her limited power of appointment over the Decedent's Trust. The document stated that the Trustee would pay the balance of both the Survivor's and Decedent's Trust equally to each of her five (5) children: Candace Louise Curtis, Carol Ann Brunsting, Carl Henry Brunsting, Amy Ruth Tschirhart and Anita Kay Riley, and such assets would be held in a separate Personal Asset Trust for the benefit of each of her children. With the exception of Carl and Candace, each descendant would be the trustee of their own Personal Asset Trust. Specifically, Amy Ruth Tschirhart, Anita Kay Brunsting and Carol Ann Brunsting would each be the trustee of their own Personal Asset Trust. Anita Kay Riley and Amy Ruth Tschirhart were appointed the co-trustees of the Personal Asset Trust for Carl Henry Brunsting and the Personal Asset Trust for Candace Louise Curtis. The document also detailed the administrative provisions relating to the Personal Asset Trusts for Nelva and Elmer Brunsting's descendants.

The major change that resulted from the August 25, 2010 Qualified Beneficiary Designation and Exercise of Testamentary Power of Appointment under Living Trust Agreement was that Carl Henry Brunsting and Candace Louis Curtis could not elect to be the individual trustee of their own Personal Asset Trusts. The August 25, 2010 document also provided different administrative provisions for the trusts created for the descendants than those provided under Article X of the Restatement.

Notably, the August 25, 2010 Qualified Beneficiary Designation and Exercise of Testamentary Power of Appointment under Living Trust Agreement contained a no contest clause which provided a lengthy list of prohibited actions that would fall under such no contest clause. The no contest clause provided that any beneficiary who took such prohibited actions would forfeit their share and be treated as if they predeceased Nelva and Elmer Brunsting.

The Death of Nelva Brunsting

Nelva Brunsting died on November 11, 2011, and the Survivor's Trust and Decedent's Trust terminated and were to pass to the Personal Asset Trusts for Candace Louise Curtis, Carol Ann Brunsting, Carl Henry Brunsting, Amy Ruth Tschirhart and Anita Kay Riley. As detailed above, these Personal Asset Trusts were created pursuant to Nelva Brunsting's August 25, 2010 Qualified Beneficiary Designation and Exercise of Testamentary Power of Appointment under Living Trust Agreement.

CLAIMS

The Probate Court Claims Filed by Carl Henry Brunsting and Candace Louise Curtis

Carl Henry Brunsting and Candace Louise Curtis have filed claims against Anita Kay Brunsting, Amy Ruth Brunsting (previously Tschirhart) and Carole Ann Brunsting in the Estate of Nelva E. Brunsting, Deceased, pending in Harris County Probate Court Number Four (4) under Cause Number 412,249 (hereinafter referred to as the “Probate Court Claims”).

Carl Henry Brunsting and Candace Louise Curtis’ Probate Court Claims are twofold. First, individual tort claims have been asserted against Anita Kay Brunsting, Amy Ruth Brunsting (previously Tschirhart) and Carole Ann Brunsting for actions taken either in their fiduciary capacity or purported actions taken which have harmed Carl and Candace. The second category of Carl and Candace’s Probate Court Claims relate to requests for declaratory relief in construing the Brunsting Family Living Trust.

The Probate Court Claims that include individual tort claims against Anita Kay Brunsting, Amy Ruth Brunsting and Carole Ann Brunsting contain multiple questions of fact, which are within the province of the jury. Specifically, Carl Henry Brunsting asserted the following tort claims:

1. Breach of fiduciary duty
2. Conversion
3. Tortious interference with inheritance rights
4. Constructive Trust over Trust assets
5. Fraud, specifically, misrepresentation of facts to Decedent (it is questionable whether Carl and Candace have standing to pursue these claims)
6. Civil Conspiracy
7. Demand for accounting of the Trusts and non-probate accounts
8. Liability of Anita Kay Brunsting, Amy Ruth Brunsting and Carole Ann Brunsting under Texas Property Code § 114.031
9. Removal of Trustees
10. Request for Receivership

The Probate Court Claims asserted by Candace Louise Curtis are as follows:

1. Breach of fiduciary duty
2. Fraud resulting from misrepresentation of material facts to Candace
3. Constructive fraud
4. Money had and received
5. Conversion
6. Tortious interference with inheritance rights
7. Unjust enrichment

8. Civil Conspiracy
9. Demand for accounting of the Trusts and non-probate accounts

As a result of the above Probate Court Claims containing questions of fact within the province of the jury, the Temporary Administrator has refrained from evaluating such claims.

The questions of law presented in both Carl Henry Brunsting and Candace Louise Curtis' requests for declaratory relief contained in the Probate Court Claims are as follows:

1. Was Nelva Brunsting's December 21, 2010 Resignation of Original Trustee and Appointment of Successor Trustee valid?
2. Were the June 15, 2010 and August 25, 2010 Qualified Beneficiary Designation and Exercise of Testamentary Power of Appointment under Living Trust Agreement an inappropriate alteration of the terms of the Trust?
3. Did the June 15, 2010 Qualified Beneficiary Designation and Exercise of Testamentary Power of Appointment under Living Trust Agreement appoint all of the Trust property?
4. Did the August 25, 2010 Qualified Beneficiary Designation and Exercise of Testamentary Power of Appointment under Living Trust Agreement revoke the June 15, 2010 Qualified Beneficiary Designation and Exercise of Testamentary Power of Appointment under Living Trust Agreement?
5. Is the August 25, 2010 Qualified Beneficiary Designation and Exercise of Testamentary Power of Appointment under Living Trust Agreement effective?
6. Do the pleadings filed by Carl and Candace violate the No Contest Clause and is the No Contest Clause void as against public policy?

Based on the powers granted to Nelva Brunsting in the Restatement, Nelva Brunsting appears to have appropriately exercised her right to resign as the original Trustee of the Trust on December 21, 2010, and appointed the successor trustee, Anita Kay Brunsting.

While the Restatement provided that the Trust could not be amended after the death of Nelva or Elmer Brunsting, this did not preclude Nelva Brunsting from exercising her general and limited power of appointments over the Survivor's Trust and Decedent's Trust. Specifically, it appears that Nelva Brunsting appropriately exercised her general power of appointment over the Survivor's Trust and her limited power of appointment over Decedent's Trust by appointing the assets to her five (5) children in trust by and through the August 25, 2010 Qualified Beneficiary Designation and Exercise of Testamentary Power of Appointment under Living Trust Agreement. The August 25, 2010 document appears to have superseded and replaced the June 15, 2010 Qualified Beneficiary

Designation and Exercise of Testamentary Power of Appointment under Living Trust Agreement. The Restatement granted Nelva Brunsting the power to appoint such assets in trust and place terms and conditions upon such assets as she desired, including her choice to designate trustees of the Personal Asset Trust of Carl Henry Brunsting and Candace Louise Curtis.

NO CONTEST CLAUSE PROVISIONS

Any claim by Carl Henry Brunsting and Candace Louise Curtis that Nelva Brunsting lacked capacity and/or was subject to undue influence when she executed the August 25, 2010 Qualified Beneficiary Designation and Exercise of Testamentary Power of Appointment under Living Trust Agreement are questions of fact that are within the province of the jury. However, the no contest clauses in the Qualified Beneficiary Designation and in the Restatement must be considered.

Section “A.” of “MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS” of the Qualified Beneficiary Designation and Exercise of Testamentary Power of Appointment under Living Trust Agreement is a no contest clause that would disinherit any person who, among other things, makes the claims stated above. The provisions of this no contest clause include language that the no contest clause applies even if a court finds that the judicial proceedings in question originated in good faith and with probable cause. This Court will have to rule on the validity of this provision.

Article XI, Section C., of the Restatement is also a no contest provision. The provisions of this no contest clause are similar in result to those stated above in the Qualified Beneficiary Designation and Exercise of Testamentary Power of Appointment under Living Trust Agreement. Therefore, a successful claim that Nelva Brunsting lacked capacity would still be subject to the no contest provisions of the Restatement. In this event the Court would have to rule on the validity of this provision of the Restatement. In both documents the provision is well written.

A decision by the Court upholding either no contest provision might resolve all other issues.

The Lawsuit of Carl Henry Brunsting in the District Court Proceeding

Carl Henry Brunsting, in his capacity as Independent Executor of the Estates of Elmer H. Brunsting and Nelva E. Brunsting, filed claims against Defendants Candace L. Kunz-Freed, Vacek & Freed, PLLC f/k/a The Vacek Law Firm, PLLC (collectively the “Defendants”). These claims of Carl Henry Brunsting were filed in the 164th District Court of Harris County, Texas (hereinafter referred to as the “District Court Claims”).

Carl Henry Brunsting asserted the following District Court Claims against Defendants in his live pleading, Plaintiff’s Third Amended Petition:

1. Negligence
2. Negligent misrepresentation
3. Breach of fiduciary duty
4. Aiding and abetting

5. Fraud
6. Conspiracy
7. Deceptive Trade Practices Act (“DTPA”) violations

Carl Henry Brunsting also pled tolling, fraudulent concealment and the discovery rule. Carl Henry Brunsting sought damages of actual damages, forfeiture of fees, treble damages and punitive damages, in addition to his attorney’s fees.

Carl Henry Brunsting’s District Court Claims center around the changes Nelva Brunsting made by and through the June 15, 2010 Qualified Beneficiary Designation and Exercise of Testamentary Power of Appointment under Living Trust Agreement and the August 25, 2010 Qualified Beneficiary Designation and Exercise of Testamentary Power of Appointment under Living Trust Agreement.

In response to Plaintiff’s District Court Claims, Defendants filed a Motion for Traditional and No–Evidence Summary Judgment on the following bases:

1. Carl Henry Brunsting improperly fractured his legal malpractice claims against Defendants;
2. Carl Henry Brunsting’s DTPA claim is barred by the professional services exemption; and
3. Carl Henry Brunsting’s negligent misrepresentation claim and DTPA claim fail because Carl Henry Brunsting admits he is not aware of any misrepresentations made by Defendants.

Defendants also moved for a No-Evidence Summary Judgment on the basis that Carl Henry Brunsting has no evidence supporting one or more of the elements on the claims he has asserted.

A Notice of Vacancy of Party and Motion to Abate Proceeding was filed by counsel for Carl Henry Brunsting. Carl Henry Brunsting has filed a resignation as executor of the aforementioned estates. Until a successor executor is appointed, there is no plaintiff to pursue the action against Defendants and no plaintiff to respond to Defendants’ summary judgment motions. The issue of who will serve as the successor executor of the Estate of Nelva E. Brunsting and the Estate of Elmer Brunsting must be resolved prior to resolving the claims against Defendants.

A Motion to transfer the district court matter to the probate court where both estates are pending has also been filed, but not yet ruled upon.

DAMAGES

Actual damages, of course, are disputed. However, the actual distributions from the Trust after Nelva resigned until shortly after she died seemed to be reasonably well documented. Previously an independent investigation resulted in a listing of the payments made from the trust.

This **REPORT OF MASTER** that was prepared in the case filed in the Southern District of Texas federal court case has the details of the Trust's income, expenses and distributions of stock. A copy of this report is attached hereto as the sixth exhibit.

From this and from changes in the assets of the trust during the period in question the damages can be determined and are basically in three categories.

Transfers of Stock

2,765 shares of Exxon Mobil stock were transferred as follows:

	1, 120	Amy
	160	Anita
	160	Candace
	<u>1, 325</u>	Carol
TOTAL	2,765	

675 shares of Chevron stock were transferred as follows:

	135	Anita
	135	Amy's daughter
	135	Amy's son
	135	Anita's daughter
	<u>135</u>	Anita's son
TOTAL	675	

It is easy to see that these distributions of stock were not evenly distributed to the five siblings. I have been told that the distributions were in fact early distributions of the recipients share from their future trusts. This could be resolved by giving those siblings that did not receive an equal amount at the time of the distributions an equivalent amount of money to settle the dispute. Of course the issue is further complicated by the fact that the value of the two stocks has changed since the time of the distributions. The proper way to determine the amount to be distributed might be to use the value of the stock on the date of the original distributions or the value on the date that money is paid to the damage sibling, whichever is greater.

Payments To/For Family

Approximately \$108,000 were paid to or for the benefit of Amy, Anita and Carol or disputed expenses including approximately \$41,000 of trustees' fees and approximately \$36,000 of legal fees.

Payments To Carol for Nelva's Care

Approximately \$160,000 was paid to Carol during the period in question. I was told that Carol was the primary sibling responsible for Nelva's care.

SUMMARY OF DAMAGES

It seems unwise to have made the stock distributions. However, this can be resolved by equalizing the distributions to all the siblings. The issue of trustees' fees can be resolved by comparing the fees to those that are considered as reasonable fees in similar circumstances. The legal fees are obviously justified and will surely increase. The amounts paid to Carol can be examined but should be liberally considered as attributed to Nelva's care and maintenance.

CONCLUSIONS

All of the legal actions taken by Nelva were within her authority under the broad provisions of the Restatement. Unless Nelva is found to have been incompetent at the time that her legal actions were taken all of the changes made in these documents apply in these proceedings.

If Nelva was incompetent at the time that she took these legal actions then a successor trustee would have been appointed under the terms of the Restatement. No claim of her being incompetent was made at that time.

Furthermore, if Nelva had been incompetent the plaintiff in the District Court case would likely have to show that the defendants knew that she was incompetent. For this and other reasons the case should be moved to the Probate Court.

There are damages for the unequal distribution of the shares of Exxon Mobil and Chevron stock. There may be damages for some of the expenditures for trustees' fees and for payments to Carol. These matters should be resolved by agreement. This may require mediation. The considerable legal fees involved in a trial far outweigh the expenses of a mediation and any compromises made by the parties at the mediation.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Remove the District Court case to the Probate Court. It is important that there not be different results for the same or similar issues that are in the cases currently in the Probate Court.
2. Require mediation. Point out the huge savings that will result from a mediation versus a trial. Possibly, inform the parties that the Court will rule on the no contest clause first if the matter is not settled in the mediation. Since this ruling could go either way both sides would have considerable incentive to settle. A ruling in favor of the no contest clause would essentially make the matters moot and the plaintiffs would take nothing and lose their inheritance.