Subject: clean exhibit - Brunsting Bru ha ha again - Then Goepp, I have fact questions
From: Rik Munson <[email-masked]>
To: Candy Schwager <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 9 Dec 2019 08:21:48 -0800

This is the raw exhibit. The one I sent was an exhibit in the RICO that 
can be discarded. The signed Order disappeared from the docket after we 
fired Jason (the unsigned remained) but I had already obtained a copy 
from the clerk before we fired Jason.

Although -402 was closed the files remained in 402 until after Horwitz 
took office.

emails between Carole Brunsting and Clarinda Comstock - (1/4/2019 
Comstock says consolidation never happened) and (1/28/2019 Comstock 
admits 402 was created when Ostrom had the cause remanded from the 
federal court).

Then Bayless gets involved and the new clerk allegedly found it in a 
drawer and it gets reinserted all the way back to March 16, 2015. AND 
all the files get dumped into 412249, the closed estate file.

*GOEPP*

Big difference between supervised administration (formal) and 
independent administration (informal) a formal probate must be closed 
following the required procedures. Independent administrator does not 
have to file closing report. (This is where we find uncertainty... the 
probate must close... see Dexel)

Valdez has a very good discussion: (there were 3 earlier decisions from 
2013 all flagged RED) This 2015 opinion appears to be good

The probate court concluded it lacked jurisdiction to appoint a 
successor administrator or reopen the probate estate without first 
setting aside the 1996 orders by bill of review. The heirs therefore 
filed a petition for bill of review on December 11, 2006, to set aside 
the probate orders (1) approving the March 1994 inventory, (2) approving 
the final account, (3) discharging Valdez and Fidelity, and (4) closing 
the estate (referred to collectively as “the 1996 probate orders”). One 
year later, a bench trial took place in the bill-of-review proceeding. 
The probate court denied the heirs' request for a statutory bill of 
review, but granted their request for an equitable bill of review and 
set aside the 1996 probate orders as void. In the judgment granting the 
bill of review, the probate court found the 1996 orders:

> /Valdez v. Hollenbeck/, 465 S.W.3d 217, 223-24 (Tex. 2015)
>
> Lee v. Ronald E. Lee Jr., Katherine Lee Stacy, & Legacy Trust Co. 
> <https://casetext.com/case/lee-v-ronald-e-lee-jr-katherine-lee-stacy-legacy-trust-co-1?q=amending%20inventory%20of%20closed%20estate%20%20AND%20reopen&p=1&tab=keyword&jxs=txcode,txrules,txsct,txapp&sort=relevance&type=case&startDate=1420070400000&within=probate&resultsNav=false#p213>
> 528 S.W.3d 201 (Tex. App. 2017)Cited 11 times 
> <https://casetext.com/case/lee-v-ronald-e-lee-jr-katherine-lee-stacy-legacy-trust-co-1/how-cited?q=amending%20inventory%20of%20closed%20estate%20%20AND%20reopen&p=1&tab=keyword&jxs=txcode,txrules,txsct,txapp&sort=relevance&type=case&startDate=1420070400000&within=probate&resultsNav=false>
> See, e.g., Tex. Est. Code Ann. § 36.001 (defining the term "probate 
> proceeding"); Valdez v. Hollenbeck, 465 S.W.3d 217, 224 n.8 (Tex. 
> 2015) (explaining that "[t]he heirs initially filed their lawsuit in 
> the original probate proceeding as a suit appertaining and incident to 
> a probate estate under [the predecessor statute] section 5A of the 
> Probate Code," under which "a probate proceeding must be pending for a 
> probate court to exercise jurisdiction over matters related to that 
> proceeding"); Frost Nat'l Bank v. Fernandez, 315 S.W.3d 494, 506 (Tex. 
> 2010) (holding that a probate court lacked jurisdiction over a 
> proceeding to declare heirship because a "court empowered with probate 
> jurisdiction may only exercise its probate jurisdiction over matters 
> incident to an estate when a probate proceeding related to such 
> matters is already pending in that court" (emphasis added) (quoting 
> Bailey v. Cherokee Cty. Appraisal Dist., 862 S.W.2d 581, 585 (Tex. 
> 1993) )); In re John G. & Marie Stella Kenedy Mem'l Found., 315 S.W.3d 
> 519, 522 (Tex. 2010) (orig. proceeding) (quoting the same language 
> from Bailey ); Goodman v. Summit at W. Rim, Ltd., 952 S.W.2d 930, 933 
> (Tex. App.—Austin 1997, no pet.) (citing Bailey ); In re Estate of 
> Hanau, 806 S.W.2d 900, 904 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1991, writ 
> denied) ("The trial court has power to hear all matters incident to an 
> estate only in those instances where a probate proceeding, such as the 
> administration of an estate, is actually pending in the court in which 
> the suit is filed, relating to a matter incident to that estate." 
> (emphasis added) (citing Interfirst Bank–Hous. v. Quintana Petroleum 
> Corp., 699 S.W.2d 864, 873 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, writ 
> ref'd n.r.e.) )); Pullen v. Swanson, 667 S.W.2d 359, 363 (Tex. 
> App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (stating that a 
> statutory probate court's jurisdiction "to hear all matters incident 
> to an estate necessarily presupposes that a probate proceeding is 
> already pending in that court" 

The case authorities are circular:

Lawton v Lawton

In re Puig

Frost Bank v Fernandez

Fernandez v Frost Bank

etc.,

The determinate factor appears to be whether there is anything under the 
will that remains "unexecuted". In other words, when all the debts have 
been paid, the assets distributed and there is no further need for 
administration.