1	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
2	HOUSTON DIVISION
3	CANDACE LOUIS CURTIS, ET AL . C.A. NO. H-16-1969 . HOUSTON, TEXAS
4	VS DECEMBER 15, 2016
5	CANDACE KUNZ-FREED, et al . 11:50 A.M. to 1:00 P.M.
6	
7	TRANSCRIPT OF MOTION HEARING BEFORE THE HONORABLE ALFRED H. BENNETT
8	UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
9	
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1	PROCEEDINGS
2	THE COURT: Cause No. 16-cv-1969, Candace Curtis,
3	et al, versus Candace Freed, et al. Come on up.
4	We have a third table over here as well, with a
5	microphone, so, please.
6	UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: This one over here?
7	THE COURT: Yes. And given the size, I do not mind if
8	you take a seat on this side of the table with your back to me,
9	I understand. I'm not going to be offended, I understand.
10	Having called Cause No. 16-cv-1969, I'm now going
11	to take the appearance of counsel, starting from my right.
12	MR. ABRAMS: Good morning, Your Honor. Barry Abrams
13	for the defendant Darlene Payne Smith.
14	MS. BAYLESS: Bobbie Bayless on my own behalf.
15	MR. HARRELL: Bob Harrell and Rafe Schaefer on behalf
16	of Jill Young.
17	THE COURT: Wait. I didn't hear the name.
18	MR. HARRELL: Jill Young.
19	THE COURT: Very well.
20	MS. BECKMAN HEDGE: Hello, Your Honor. Laura Beckman
21	Hedge. I'm here on behalf of Judge Christine Riddle Butts,
22	Judge Clarinda Comstock and Toni Biamonte.
23	THE COURT: Very well.
24	MS. CURTIS: Candace Curtis here
25	THE COURT: Use the microphone so that

MS. CURTIS: Candace Curtis on behalf of myself. 1 2 THE COURT: Very well. MR. MUNSON: My name is Rik Munson. I'm a private 3 attorney general plaintiff, pro se. 4 5 THE COURT: Very well. MR. REID: Eron Reid on behalf of Neal Spielman. 6 7 THE COURT: I'm sorry, on behalf of? 8 MR. REID: Neal Spielman. 9 THE COURT: Counsel? MR. GREENE: Adraon Greene, Your Honor, on behalf of 10 Stephen Mendel and Bradley Featherston. 11 THE COURT: Counsel? Oh, right here. 12 MR. SPIELMAN: Oh, Your Honor, I'm just -- I'm the 13 14 client -- or the defendant, Neal Spielman. 15 THE COURT: Oh, very well. UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I'm likewise a client of 16 17 Mr. Greene. THE COURT: Very well. 18 19 Cory Reed on behalf of Candace Freed and Al MR. REED: 20 Vacek. 21 MS. FOLEY: Zandra Foley on behalf of Candace Freed 22 and Al Vacek. 23 I'm representing MR. MATHEWS: Bernard Mathews. 24 myself, Your Honor. 25 MR. OSTROM: Your Honor, Jason Ostrom on behalf of my

1 myself and Gregory Lester.

2 THE COURT: You said on behalf of yourself? MR. OSTROM: Myself and Gregory Lester. 3 4 THE COURT: Are you an attorney? 5 MR. OSTROM: I am. 6 THE COURT: Very well. 7 MS. ANITA BRUNSTING: Anita Brunsting on behalf of 8 myself. THE COURT: Very well. 9 MS. AMY BRUNSTING: Amy Brunsting on behalf of myself. 10 11 THE COURT: Very well. Counsel, for today's hearing there are a number 12 of motions to dismiss and I'm going to call them out, 13 14 hopefully, and I won't miss them. Defendants Candace Freed and Albert Vacek's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. 15 MS. FOLEY: Yes, Your Honor. 16 THE COURT: Defendants Candace Freed and Albert 17 Vacek's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter 18 19 jurisdiction. I just said yes, Your Honor. 20 MS. FOLEY: THE COURT REPORTER: Can you state your name? 21 22 THE COURT: Oh, state your name. 23 MS. FOLEY: Zandra Foley. 24 THE COURT: Yes, when you speak, state your name 25 With this cast of Spartacus before us, the court aqain.

reporter will greatly appreciate the assist. 1 2 Bobbie Bayless's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. 3 MS. BAYLESS: Bobbie Bayless, yes, Your Honor. 4 5 THE COURT: Defendant Brunsting's motion for access to electronic filing. Is that in this? 6 7 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Which one? 8 THE COURT: Oh, Anita. MS. ANITA BRUNSTING: Yes. 9 Is that on today's docket? 10 THE COURT: MS. ANITA BRUNSTING: I believe that was approved. 11 12 THE COURT: Okay. Defendant Jill Willard Young's 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. 13 MR. HARRELL: Bob Harrell. 14 Yes. 15 THE COURT: Defendant Anita Brunsting's Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for plaintiffs' failure to state a claim. 16 MS. ANITA BRUNSTING: 17 Yes. 18 THE COURT: And you are? 19 MS. ANITA BRUNSTING: I'm Anita Brunsting. THE COURT: Very well. 20 Defendant Amy Brunsting's Rule 12(b)(6) motion to 21 dismiss for plaintiffs' failure to state a claim. 22 23 MS. AMY BRUNSTING: Amy Brunsting. Yes, Your Honor. THE COURT: Defendants Mendel and Featherston's Rule 24 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for plaintiffs' failure to state a 25

1 claim.

MR. GREENE: Adraon Greene. Yes, Your Honor. 2 THE COURT: Defendant Jill Willard Young's motion to 3 4 strike plaintiffs' addendum and memorandum in support of RICO 5 complaint. 6 MR. HARRELL: Bob Harrell. Yes, Your Honor. 7 THE COURT: And that's on today's --8 MR. HARRELL: It's part of the motion to dismiss, so, 9 yes, Your Honor. THE COURT: Very well. 10 Defendant Neal Spielman's motion to dismiss. 11 MR. REID: Eron Reid. Yes, Your Honor. 12 THE COURT: And there was also Defendant Neal 13 14 Spielman's motion to dismiss based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 15 MR. REID: Eron Reid. Yes, Your Honor. 16 THE COURT: I also have in my folder plaintiffs' 17 motion for consolidation of related cases pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 18 19 Section 1367, Rule 42(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil 20 Procedure and Local Rule 7.6 with supporting memoranda. 21 MS. CURTIS: Yes, Your Honor. Candace Curtis. 22 THE COURT: Defendant Judge Christine Butts, Judge 23 Comstock, et al, motion to dismiss complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and (6). 24 25 MS. BECKMAN HEDGE: Laura Beckman Hedge. Yes, Your

1 Honor.

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2 THE COURT: Plaintiffs' motion for -- I covered that 3 one.

Defendants Mendel and Featherston's joinder in Jill Willard Young's motion to strike plaintiffs' addendum to memorandum in support of RICO complaint.

7 MR. GREENE: Adraon Greene. Yes, Your Honor.
 8 THE COURT: And Defendant Jill Willard Young's motion
 9 for sanctions.

10MR. HARRELL:Bob Harrell.And we filed it.I don't11know if it's technically on the docket today but --

THE COURT: For today. Okay. Thank you.

13Defendant Jason Ostrom's motion to dismiss14complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).15MR. OSTROM: Yes, Your Honor. Jason Ostrom.

16 *THE COURT:* Motion to dismiss Defendant Bernard
17 Mathews.

18 MR. MATHEWS: Bernard Mathews. That is correct, Your
 19 Honor.

THE COURT: Very well.

And Defendant Gregory Lester's motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). *MR. OSTROM:* Jason Ostrom. Yes, that's correct.

24 *THE COURT:* And, finally, Defendant Darlene Payne
25 Smith, motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. 1 2 MR. ABRAMS: Barry Abrams. Yes, Your Honor. 3 dismiss? 4 5 MS. FOLEY: Your Honor, Zandra Foley. We also had a state a claim. THE COURT: Very well. 9 Anyone else on this side, did I miss your motion that was under consideration for today? Willard Young filed, striking -- motion to strike plaintiffs' addendum of memorandum in support of RICO complaint. 16 17 THE COURT: Very well. 18 MS. BECKMAN HEDGE: Thank you.

19 THE COURT: Well, to be most efficient, we have a lot of 12(b)(6) motions, which I assume making similar arguments. 20 There may be individual facts for each defendant. 21 So, why 22 don't we pick someone to present a motion, perhaps the first 23 one that was filed, and then we can move from that and you can 24 tell me if there are specifics, but you do not need to reurge 25 the essence of the legal arguments in the first motion. That

THE COURT: Okay. Did I miss anyone's motion to

motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction that 6 7 was filed separately from the motion to dismiss for failure to 8

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12 MS. BECKMAN HEDGE: Laura Beckman Hedge, Your Honor. The defendants, Judge Butts, Judge Comstock, and Toni Biamonte 13 14 joined in the motion that you mentioned earlier that Jill 15

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1 way we can save a little time.

2	Mr. Harrell, I see you rising to your feet.
3	MR. HARRELL: Yes, Your Honor. If it please the
4	Court, we're prepared to give an overview of the motions and
5	the law. And if it please the Court, our lawyer, Rafe
6	Schaefer, would like to make that presentation.
7	THE COURT: All in accord with that? Any objections
8	from any of the defendants? Very well.
9	MR. SCHAEFER: Thank you, Your Honor. My name is Rafe
10	Schaefer with Norton Rose Fulbright, along with Bob Harrell.
11	We represent Defendant Jill Willard Young, who is in the
12	courtroom here today, who is an attorney with the law firm of
13	MacIntyre, McCulloch, Stanfield and Young here in Houston. She
14	practices probate law.
15	Plaintiffs in this matter have sued, as you can
16	see, more than 15 defendants who are lawyers, judges, other
17	legal professionals, like court reporters, and other
18	participants in a probate matter who practice in Harris County
19	Probate Court No. 4.
20	Plaintiffs' claims in their complaint consist of
21	an allegation that the defendants collectively are members of a
22	secret society and what plaintiffs call a cabal that they call
23	Harris County Tomb Raiders Association. They also call it the
24	Harris County Probate Mafia.

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Plaintiffs' allegation comes down to a RICO

claim, and plaintiffs allege that the folks in this courtroom are members of a shadow organization that engage in poser advocacy. And plaintiffs appear to say that poser advocacy is the fake practice of law by the attorneys and lawyers -- or the attorneys and judges and court reporters in this room that's designed to, in plaintiffs' words, highjack familiar wealth from decedent's estates in the probate system.

8 Effectively, Your Honor, the best I can tell, 9 plaintiffs allege that the folks in this room are in this 10 probate mafia and they engage in the fake practice of law in 11 Probate Court No. 4 to generate attorneys' fees, which 12 plaintiffs say defund the estates in the probate court. And 13 that's plaintiffs' theory of the case and theory of how they're 14 entitled to damages.

Against Ms. Young, plaintiffs purport to allege ten causes of action. They allege a RICO cause of action; three claims for honest services fraud; a claim for wire fraud; a claim for fraud under 18 U.S.C. Section 1001; a Hobbs Act claim; and three conspiracy claims.

Now, those claims all fail for three very simple reasons. The first reason they fail is a reason that applies to everyone in this room; and that is, that plaintiffs have simply failed to state a claim on which relief can be granted under Twombly and Iqbal and the plausibility standard of Rule 12, but also just that plaintiffs' complaint itself is

delusional and fanciful and this Court should use its inherent
 powers to dismiss that complaint.

The second basis and the second reason 3 plaintiffs' complaint should be dismissed also applies to 4 5 everyone in this room, and it's that plaintiffs have failed to show they have standing to sue for RICO and the other causes of 6 action that they've sued for are criminal causes of action that 7 8 aren't privately actionable in federal court. And we've cited a lot of case law, that they can't bring it. And so the only 9 claim that they really can bring is the RICO claim, and they've 10 alleged no direct injury that would give them standing to sue. 11

The third reason why plaintiffs' complaint should 12 be dismissed against Ms. Young is -- particularly Ms. Young and 13 14 some other folks in here, but Ms. Young is protected by Texas's 15 attorney immunity doctrine, which I'll talk about very briefly, I mentioned plaintiffs' allegations. 16 Your Honor. They appear 17 to relate to a probate matter in Harris County Probate Court No. 4. Plaintiffs call that the Curtis v. Brunsting matter. 18 19 They don't ever mention a cause number. I think, Your Honor, since they've sued Ms. Young, the only matter Ms. Young was 20 ever involved in that involved plaintiff Curtis is the matter 21 of *In re: Estate of Nelva Brunsting*, which is in Probate Court 22 23 No. 4.

But Plaintiff Munson wasn't a party to that matter. He wasn't a beneficiary to that estate. He doesn't

have any relationship to Ms. Young. He doesn't appear to have
 standing to sue at all in this matter.

In the Brunsting matter, Ms. Young, my client, 3 was an attorney for Temporary Administrator Lester, who is also 4 5 a defendant here today. Temporary Administrator Lester was appointed by Probate Court No. 4 to prepare a single written 6 report. Ms. Young assisted him as his attorney in preparation 7 8 of that single report, and that's all she did. All of the 9 actions taken by Ms. Young in that probate matter were in her role as attorney to Ms. -- I'm sorry, to Mr. Lester. 10 The plaintiffs don't dispute that. Ms. Young never had a fiduciary 11 relationship with either plaintiff. Plaintiffs don't dispute 12 that. 13

In fact, nowhere in their entire complaint do plaintiffs allege Ms. Young committed a single wrongful act or did anything other than act as an attorney for Temporary Administrator Lester.

So, I want to go through very briefly, Your 18 19 Honor, the three bases for dismissal that I mentioned earlier. 20 The first is that plaintiffs' complaint doesn't state a claim for relief. And that's under Twombly and Iqbal, but also just 21 22 that it's delusional, Your Honor, and that this Court should 23 use its powers to dismiss that. Under Rule 12, as this Court 24 knows, plaintiffs' complaint must be dismissed under Twombly 25 and Iqbal if it's too implausible to state a claim for relief.

This means that the Court should ignore all legal conclusions
 in the complaint, and it has to look at whether the
 well-pleaded facts permit the Court to infer more than the mere
 possibility of misconduct.

5 Here there is nothing in the complaint but boilerplate legal conclusions, Your Honor. 6 There are no 7 allegations of wrongful acts by Ms. Young. There are no 8 allegations of wrongful acts, you know, pleaded with any sort 9 of specificity that can identify an alleged actual wrongful act by plaintiffs, other than plaintiffs' allegation that there's 10 this probate mafia engaging in poser advocacy, but there's no 11 actual examples of what that is or how that took place. 12

> *THE COURT:* Is the operative complaint Document No. 1? *MR. SCHAEFER:* Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Very well.

MR. SCHAEFER: Other courts in this district have 16 17 dismissed RICO cases very similar for this exact same reason. There's a matter that we cited to in our motion to dismiss 18 19 called Freeman v. Texas, which is a 2008 case decided by Judge 20 Rosenthal, where Judge Rosenthal dismissed is a complaint alleging a probate court was a RICO enterprise comprised of 21 22 judges who, quote, conspired against pro se litigants that 23 virtually looted the pro se litigant's homestead through a probate proceeding. And the Court -- Judge Rosenthal held that 24 25 even if all of those allegations were true, they failed to

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state a racketeering activity because plaintiff hadn't alleged sufficient facts to raise a colorable claim that any violation of any of the predicate RICO acts had actually occurred. So, the Court held in light of the absence of any well-pleaded facts sufficient to state a RICO claim, that claim was dismissed.

7 The same is true here, Your Honor. But in 8 addition to just being implausible on its face, the complaint 9 is frivolous and delusional, and just a facial reading of the 10 complaint shows the Court that that's true. And this Court has 11 inherent authority to dismiss a pro se litigant's frivolous or 12 malicious complaint.

To determine whether a complaint is frivolous or 13 14 malicious, a court has to look at the complaint and see whether 15 the allegations are clearly baseless, which means the allegations are fanciful, fantastical, or delusional. 16 Here, again, plaintiffs allege that the folks in this courtroom are 17 members of a secret society called the Harris County Tomb 18 19 Raiders that defraud estates through poser advocacy by all these mafia members -- probate mafia members. Your Honor, 20 these allegations are fanciful and delusional. 21

I would direct you to a very recent decision from an order from Judge Hoyt, who considered an almost identical case, called *Sheshtawy versus Conservative Club of Houston*. We have cited that. I have the order, if you would like to see a 1 copy of it.

2	There the Court was considering, you know, almost
3	identical allegations, Your Honor, although dealing with
4	Probate Court No. 1 instead of Probate Court No. 4. And the
5	Court held in that order that the allegations that Probate
6	Court No. 1 in Harris County and all the litigants and parties
7	in that court were a RICO enterprise. The Court said that
8	legal theory is, quote, "pure zanyism." The same is true here.
9	We've cited the Sheshtawy order in our briefing. You now have
10	a copy of it. This allegation, too, is pure zanyism. It's
11	fanciful, it's delusional, and it fails to state a claim for
12	relief that can be granted by this Court.

The second basis that -- for why plaintiffs' 13 14 claim fails, is they don't have standing to sue on any of the causes of action they've alleged. First, I want to talk about 15 RICO. And, again, this applies to everyone in this courtroom. 16 17 Plaintiffs don't have standing to bring suit under RICO, because RICO requires a direct injury in order for a party to 18 19 sue. A plaintiff can only sue if they can show some RICO 20 violation was a direct and but for cause of the injury. The court in Sheshtawy, in that same order I just handed to you, 21 22 Your Honor, held that plaintiffs had failed to show they had 23 standing to bring a RICO case because, quote, "Routine litigation conduct cannot become a basis for a RICO suit." 24 That's all that's going on here. Ms. Young 25

represented Temporary Administrator Lester, who was appointed 1 2 by the Court. But even if they alleged real allegations of wrongdoing, their assertion that the way there's damage is 3 through this poser advocacy that defunds estates, it's not 4 5 actionable by them individually as potential beneficiaries of There's a Sixth Circuit case that we've cited to 6 the estate. 7 titled *Firestone*, Your Honor. And in that case the 8 beneficiaries of the Firestone Tire family estate asserted RICO 9 claims against the executor of the estate and the trustee of the estate. And the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district 10 court's dismissal, saying that those plaintiffs, the 11 beneficiaries, didn't have standing to sue. The alleged RICO 12 harm was that the executor of the estate and the trustee of the 13 14 estate had lowered the value of the estate, such that when the 15 estate paid out, the beneficiaries of the estate didn't get as much money as they should have. 16

The Court said this is basically like a 17 corporate -- like a corporate -- corporation versus shareholder 18 19 lawsuit, and there aren't derivative claims here where 20 shareholders can bring the claims. The injury is to the estate. Like when a corporation is injured, the injury is to 21 22 the corporation. The shareholders to a corporation can't bring 23 suit for an injury that happens to the corporation, just like 24 the beneficiaries of an estate can't bring suit for harm to the 25 estate.

Here it couldn't be more clear. The allegation
 is all of these people engaged in this advocacy that lowered
 the value of the estate. If that is a real harm that is really
 actionable, it's the estate's claim. It's not these
 individuals' claim.

6 And then, again, for everyone in this room, Your 7 Honor, the other claims asserted by plaintiffs, the Hobbs Act 8 claim, wire fraud, fraud under 18 U.S.C. Section 1001, honest 9 services fraud, none of those causes of action create -- I'm sorry, none of those statutes create private causes of action. 10 They're all federal criminal statutes that can only be brought 11 by the government. We've cited a plethora of case law in our 12 motion to dismiss, showing that plaintiffs can't bring those 13 14 claims. That hasn't been responded to. And they should be dismissed. 15

16 The third reason that is particular to Ms. Young for why plaintiffs' claims should be dismissed is that 17 Ms. Young is protected by Texas's attorney immunity doctrine. 18 19 Under Texas law, an attorney is immune from civil liability to 20 a non-client, quote, "for actions taken in connection with representing a client in litigation even when that conduct is 21 22 wrongful conduct in the underlying litigation." That's a Texas 23 Supreme Court case that held that, Cantey Hanger versus Byrd. Here, again, there's no allegation that Ms. Young did anything 24 25 other than assist Temporary Administrator Lester in his

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preparation of this report. That is action she took as an
 attorney for someone else. She didn't owe a fiduciary duty to
 plaintiffs. She is immune from suit under Texas's attorney
 immunity doctrine.

5 Your Honor briefly mentioned earlier the motion for sanctions that we had filed. Actually in the Sheshtawy 6 7 matter that I mentioned to you, the Court yesterday -- Judge 8 Hoyt yesterday issued an order granting sanctions against the 9 plaintiffs in that matter. We served plaintiffs with our motion for sanctions on September 27th, 2016. Under Rule 11, 10 the safe harbor provision, we waited until October 27th, 2016, 11 to file that motion. Plaintiffs haven't even bothered to 12 respond to that motion. Thus, we ask that when this Court 13 14 dismisses plaintiffs' complaint, it also grant the motion for sanctions. 15

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THE COURT: Very well.

MR. SCHAEFER: Thank you, Your Honor.

18 *THE COURT:* Let's start from my right. Counsel, are 19 there any individual arguments that need to be made on behalf 20 of your client other than what have been asserted by way of 21 this general background?

MR. ABRAMS: The only factual point --

23 THE COURT: Name and client.

24 *MR. ABRAMS:* Thank you, Your Honor. Barry Abrams for 25 Darlene Payne Smith. The only factual point I want to make is

there's one -- only one paragraph in the complaint mentioning 1 2 Ms. Smith. And the conduct attributed to Ms. Smith was opposing a motion for protection, which is conduct as a lawyer 3 in a litigated matter that falls within the immunity. 4 That's 5 the only factual allegation with regard to Ms. Smith. I join in all the other arguments counsel has made. 6 7 THE COURT: Very well. 8 Ms. Bayless? MS. BAYLESS: Yes, Your Honor. Bobbie Bayless on my 9 own behalf. 10 11 The only point I will make is that factually the 12 only allegation made against me -- I represent one of the Brunsting siblings. And the only allegation made against me is 13 that I withdrew or passed a hearing on a motion for partial 14 summary judgment that I had filed on my client's behalf when he 15 resigned as executor. So, not only did it need to be passed, 16 because at that point there was a vacancy in that position and 17 it would have only been a partial hearing on a partial motion 18 19 for summary judgment on only his individual claims and not the estate's claims until that vacancy could be filled, but it's 20 also my own motion and I can pass at any time I want to. 21 And that is the allegation against me. 22 23 THE COURT: Very well. Ms. Hedge? 24 MS. BECKMAN HEDGE: Yes, Your Honor. May I approach 25 the lecturn?

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THE COURT: Yes.

2 MS. BECKMAN HEDGE: Thank you. Laura Beckman Hedge.
3 I represent Judge Comstock, Judge Butts, and Toni Biamonte.

Your Honor, there's -- I want to talk about some specific things to my clients and then there's just a few other additional arguments that I would like to add to what's already been discussed that hasn't actually been covered, but that I would want the Court to consider in its ruling.

9 The claims that have been made against the judges 10 and against the court reporter who -- Toni Biamonte, Your 11 Honor, was a substitute court reporter, not the one that's 12 normally assigned to this probate judge, but actually covered a 13 single hearing and for that has been sued in this case.

They have all been accused of being blatantly corrupt, conspiring to loot assets, exploiting the elders of society, and unjustly enriching the attorneys in this case. The predicate acts that have been alleged in this case against the judges is referral of a case to what the plaintiffs refer to Judge Davidson as an extortionist, thug mediator, and removing a motion for summary judgment from a hearing docket.

With regard to Mr. Biamonte, he has been alleged to have knowingly and willfully destroyed some unidentified material evidence. Your Honor, when a response was filed to our motion to dismiss, the grounds that were given why Mr. Biamonte was sued was because they were not satisfied with his response concerning the unavailability of a transcript from the single hearing that he recorded. They said that he was sued because he didn't respond to their e-mail. Clearly that is frivolous, and I would argue sanctionable, Your Honor, for bringing him into this lawsuit.

The plaintiffs have sued my clients for at least 6 15 different claims. With respect to the subject matter 7 8 jurisdiction argument, counsel's already covered the fact that there was no direct injury. You must have a tangible financial 9 loss. Even the plaintiffs have stated in their pleadings that 10 they are suing for threats of injury to property rights of what 11 Ms. Curtis has, as she has defined, an expectancy interes \bigcirc 12 Mr. Munson has no expectancy interest, period. 13

14 He has identified himself as the domestic partner of 15 Ms. Curtis.

Further, Your Honor, they have alleged fraud, 16 various counts of fraud. They are unspecified. And under Rule 17 9(b), it requires specificity. They have to state the who, 18 19 what, when, where, and how. They have a 59-page complaint, 217 20 They have not been specific and have not met the paragraphs. There has not been any unlawful act alleged. 21 requirements. 22 There are no facts supporting any actionable predicate act. 23 The numerous claims they've made are generalized, and they are not predicate acts of racketeering activity. 24 The claims against my client to which I would refer, and I'm not going to 25

list them all by name, I'll just refer to them by number,
 Claims 12, 38, 23, 44, 46, and 47.

The judges, Your Honor, have a unique immunity in 3 this case, and that is judicial immunity. There is case law 4 5 cited in our motion concerning judicial immunity. The plaintiffs have attempted to get around the judicial immunity 6 argument, because they know it's a winner, by trying to contend 7 8 that the actions were nonjudicial. However, when you look at the acts they've actually complained of, they are clearly 9 The factors that are considered are: Is the action 10 judicial. normally performed by a judge? Did the act occur in the 11 12 courtroom? Does the controversy center on a pending case before a judge? Does the act arise from an exchange with the 13 judge in his or her official capacity? 14

Now, importantly, Your Honor, those factors are construed broadly in favor of immunity, and not all of them are required. In fact, just one factor alone would be sufficient for a finding of judicial -- that there was a judicial act.

19 The only two exceptions to judicial immunity are: 20 Number one, if it's nonjudicial; or, number two, if the 21 judicial act was taken in a complete absence of jurisdiction. 22 There has been no allegation that any of the actions taken were 23 done in a complete absence of jurisdiction. And there's 24 certainly no facts supporting that.

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Additionally, Your Honor, the judges are entitled

to the Eleventh Amendment protection and governmental immunity 1 2 for claims for them acting in their official capacity. The Fifth Circuit in *Kirkendall versus Grambling* at 4 F.3d 989, 3 that involved a case of RICO violations against three judges 4 5 and the court's secretary. The court in that case found that they were entitled to judicial immunity and that the court's 6 secretary was entitled to quasi-judicial immunity. 7 The court 8 in that case rejected the plaintiffs' arguments that immunity did not apply as frivolous. 9

The actions complained of, Your Honor, concerning 10 the judges, that they have obstructed justice by removing the 11 summary judgment motion from the calendar and creating what 12 they call stasis, for conspiring to redirect the litigation 13 14 away from the public record to a staged mediation, which, Your Honor, actually never took place. Those actions that I've just 15 described, those are functions normally performed by a judge. 16 17 Clearly what they are complaining about are judicial acts.

Your Honor, I want to turn now to Toni Biamonte, 18 19 the substitute court reporter. He is entitled to official 20 immunity. He is entitled to that because they have sued him as the, quote, "official court reporter for the probate court." 21 They have not alleged that he's been sued in any individual 22 23 capacity. When you sue an official in their official capacity, 24 it is the same as suing the county. And Harris County cannot be liable for a RICO violation. And the reason for that is 25

because, number one, they cannot form the mens rea to commit a
 criminal act, and intent is required under RICO. And, number
 two, because RICO is punitive in nature. And municipal
 entities have common law immunity from punitive damages.

In fact, Your Honor, it was mentioned a minute
ago that Judge Hoyt issued an order yesterday of sanctions.
And I just want to direct the Court to one thing in particular.
And I do have a copy of that order, if it please the Court.

9 And, Your Honor, I apologize. We do not have a 10 copy of that for the plaintiffs. But I can get that for them 11 as soon as the hearing is over.

12MR. SCHAEFER:Your Honor, Rafe Schaefer.I've got a13copy.I can pass one on.

MS. BECKMAN HEDGE: Your Honor, what I would just like to point the Court to, on the first page of the order granting sanctions, when the Court granted it, it said it's based on the following findings of fact and conclusions of law. And the one paragraph in here that I want to my highlight for the Court is Paragraph 18. And I just want to read two sentences out of that.

"This motion for a new trial comes on the backdrop of additional claims that were frivolous and that Mr. Cheatham and Mr. Gabel" -- those were the lawyers for the plaintiffs, Your Honor -- "should have known lacked basis. Those include the following: One, there was no basis for breach of a fiduciary duty claim against opposing attorneys, such as CCJ attorneys; two, there is a litigation privilege in Texas for opposing attorneys like CCJ attorneys with no general fraud exception; three, that the honorable judges and court coordinator are entitled to immunity; four, Harris County, as a governmental entity, cannot be liable under RICO."

7 Your Honor, there is precedent. As I just read, 8 even Judge Hoyt agrees, that there is immunity that applies and 9 that Harris County cannot be liable. And, therefore, Toni 10 Biamonte in this case cannot be liable.

Finally, Your Honor, there is another immunity 11 that applies here and that is called qualified immunity. 12 Ιt requires the plaintiff to allege that there has been a 13 14 constitutional violation. There has been no such allegation 15 made and certainly no facts to support it. In, Bagby versus King, a case out of the Western District of Texas, the court 16 there held that the claims against the judges, the district 17 clerk, the appeals court clerk were barred by judicial or 18 19 qualified immunity. In that particular case, Your Honor, there were allegations regarding the way that the case had been 20 handled and the disposition of the cases. 21

Finally, Your Honor, with respect to the failure Finally, Your Honor, with respect to the failure to state a claim, which is applicable to all of the defendants here, a few additional points I just want to add. One is that the plaintiffs have failed to allege a conspiracy. They have used only conclusory language throughout their complaint. The
 civil conspiracy that they have alleged is a derivative tort.
 It requires an agreement to commit predicate acts. There are
 no allegations of any agreement and certainly no facts to
 support that.

Additionally, Your Honor, they have failed to 6 7 allege the existence of an enterprise or of an association, in 8 fact, also required for a RICO violation. They contend that Probate Court 4 is an enterprise because it's involved in 9 various aspects of interstate and foreign commerce by a 10 adjudicating suits involving persons and property outside of 11 Texas. A conclusion, Your Honor. There is no facts to support 12 that there is an enterprise in Probate Court 4. It is not a 13 14 legal entity and cannot be an enterprise.

Additionally, Your Honor, they have also not pled that there has been any pattern of racketeering activity. They only make conclusory allegations.

18 Thank you, Your Honor. I appreciate your time.
19 THE COURT: Continuing to move to my left as to
20 defendants as to specific facts or arguments that need to be
21 articulated on behalf of the defendants that you represent -- I
22 don't need to hear a repeat. If you want to adopt what has
23 been said, note that; and if there's anything additional that
24 you need to say, let me know that. So, first, counsel.

25

MR. REID: Your Honor, Eron Reid for Neal Spielman.

1	My client represented Amy Brunsting in the Probate Matter 4.
2	The only allegations the specific factual allegations him
3	are for his conduct in the March 9th status conference hearing.
4	That's the only additional thing I would add is covered under
5	the attorney immunity.
6	THE COURT: Very well. Hold it. Anything else?
7	MR. REID: Nothing other than I adopt everything else.
8	THE COURT: Very well.
9	Counsel?
10	UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Yes, sir
11	THE COURT: Hold on.
12	UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I'm sorry.
13	THE COURT: I'm going to go here, across the front.
14	MR. GREENE: Your Honor, Adraon Greene for Defendants
15	Stephen Mendel and Bradley Featherston. The only thing we
16	would like to add, Your Honor, is our clients also represented
17	Mrs. Anita Brunsting as of November 2014. All of the acts
18	alleged against my clients arose from that representation,
19	specifically disseminating the dissemination of voice
20	recordings, which they're required to do under the Texas Rules
21	of Civil Procedure, because those voice recordings are
22	witness are witness statements.
23	The objection that was filed to trust
24	distributions, which the court in the probate court sustained,
25	because the court found that that request for a distribution

was not for the health, education, maintenance, and support of
 any trustee, instead it was for a request to pay attorney's
 fees.

And, finally, the last act was simply to schedule mediation, which obviously pursuant to the representation of Mr. Brunsting, they thought that was the appropriate thing to do. Otherwise, Your Honor, we adopt all the previously made arguments.

9THE COURT: Very well. Coming around this way.10MS. AMY BRUNSTING: Me?11THE COURT: Yes, ma'am.

MS. AMY BRUNSTING: Amy Brunsting.

12

13 *THE COURT:* Why don't you have that mike -- there you
14 go. Thank you.

15 MS. AMY BRUNSTING: Amy Brunsting. There are just two issues that haven't been addressed yet. The first one is 16 regarding the recordings on the phone. The plaintiff has not 17 shown any evidence or provided any facts that show that I had 18 19 any knowledge or handling or anything to do with those recordings. Yet I'm accused of doing wiretapping and 20 possessing these things, and I have never seen them. 21 So, 22 there's no basis in fact on that.

And the other one is that they refer to a heinous extortion instrument, which in reality is a qualified beneficiary trust that was prepared for my mother by her and

1	her attorneys. I had no authority I had no business doing
2	any of the preparation of that document at all. That was done
<mark>3</mark>	while my mother was alive. And that was her private affairs.
<mark>4</mark>	On my mother's death, my sister Anita and I
<mark>5</mark>	became trustees of the Brunsting Family Trust, and that is the
<mark>6</mark>	only reason that I'm being involved in all of this. But prior
<mark>7</mark>	to that time, I had no fiduciary responsibility towards the
8	plaintiff. One of the plaintiffs, I've never met before,
9	Mr. Munson. Until this case happened, I had never met him, had
<mark>10</mark>	any kind of dealings with him. I have no fiduciary
11	responsibility to him that I know of. I've never had any kind
<mark>12</mark>	of business dealings with him at all. And they cannot or
<mark>13</mark>	have not explained how with any kind of facts, as to how I'm
<mark>14</mark>	connected to him.
<mark>15</mark>	THE COURT: And you represent yourself?
<mark>16</mark>	<i>MS. AMY BRUNSTING:</i> Yes, sir.
<mark>17</mark>	THE COURT: Very well. Ma'am?
<mark>18</mark>	MS. ANITA BRUNSTING: Anita Brunsting, representing
<mark>19</mark>	myself. And I adopt what's been said.
<mark>20</mark>	THE COURT: Very well.
<mark>21</mark>	Counselor?
<mark>22</mark>	MR. OSTROM: Yes, Your Honor. I've got two clients,
<mark>23</mark>	myself and Mr. Lester. I'm going to break them out separately.
<mark>24</mark>	With regard to myself, I'm a little different situated than the
<mark>25</mark>	other parties to this proceeding, because <mark>I, in fact, was the</mark>

1	attorney for Ms. Curtis in the underlying proceeding.
2	The other unique part about it, is that I was
3	terminated before most of the alleged predicate acts that she
4	complains of. So, my termination of role and role in the case
5	has ceased and her facts really don't go to me. To the extent
6	that the facts do go to me, it involves the movement of the
7	case and filing the pleading in Probate Court 4 that asserts
8	claims as to a trust and the defects in a trust. That's
9	important, because we're talking about damage under RICO and
10	her claims, as I understand, still exist. The same claims that
11	she believes she's been harmed or deprived of are still
12	currently pending. They're active claims. The same the
13	pleadings she complains that I didn't adequately represent her
14	in support of a conspiracy with the other counsel assert the
15	same claims, and it's still pending. So, I can't see how she
16	can indicate that I've harmed her in any way.
17	With regard to Mr. Lester, we adopt, and myself,
18	we adopt the arguments already presented. Thank you.
19	THE COURT: Very well.
20	MR. MATHEWS: Your Honor, Bernard Mathews, Your Honor.
21	I guess I am alleged to be oh, I'm sorry.
22	THE COURT: No, no. Microphone.
23	MR. MATHEWS: You can't hear.
24	I guess I'm alleged to be one of the card
25	carrying members of the probate mafia in Houston, which I would

have to say I would be proud to be a part of in this particular
 case, because all I can see is hardworking attorneys and court
 officials trying to bring some resolution to this very bitter
 dispute between the siblings of this trust.

5 I personally had about two months of involvement in this case back in 2012 when I represented Anita and Amy 6 7 I made an appearance in Judge Hoyt's court with Brunsting. 8 respect to a motion to lift a lis pendens so a fair market 9 value sale could occur, and then later communicated some financial information to Ms. Bayless. I'm had no direct 10 representation of the defendants, and I had nothing whatsoever 11 12 to do with the probate proceedings in Court 4.

13 So, I would then, again, adopt the attorney 14 immunity doctrine on behalf of both Ms. Brunstings here and all 15 the other arguments which have been made.

16

THE COURT: Thank you, counselor.

Zandra Foley for Candace Freed and Al 17 MS. FOLEY: They are the lawyers who drafted the trust agreements 18 Vacek. 19 in this case, and so they were not a part of any lawsuit in 20 Probate Court 4. They are not a party, and they never represented any of the parties in Probate Court 4. So, I adopt 21 22 the arguments that have been made everyone else. However, with 23 respect to the immunity, that wouldn't apply to my clients. 24 But something kind of similar would, and that is the Barcelo 25 case, Barcelo versus Elliot, which is a Texas Supreme Court

case from 1996. And that case essentially held that
 beneficiaries are not permitted to sue the estate planning
 lawyer, simply because it relies on the age old rule of
 privity. Meaning you have to have privity with the lawyer in
 order to sue them. And so that argument is a little bit
 different.

7 The only other thing I'll mention is that 8 specifically with respect to Mr. Munson, in response to our motion to dismiss the plaintiff, in Paragraph 69, specifically 9 states, "One thing plaintiffs and defendants appear to agree on 10 is that Munson is not a party to any of the prior lawsuits nor 11 12 is he a beneficiary of the Brunsting family trust, and that" -and he's quoting our motion -- "it is inconceivable that he 13 14 could be injured as a result of V & F's, " that's Vacek and 15 Freed, "drafting of the estate planning documents." And based on that admission and all the other arguments, we believe that 16 these claims should be dismissed. 17

THE COURT: Very well. And?

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19

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23

MR. FEATHESTON: Your Honor, I'm Brad Featherston.

THE COURT: Very well. And?

21 *MR. MENDEL:* I'm represented by Mr. Greene, Your 22 Honor.

THE COURT: Very well.

All right. You heard the motions to dismiss, the presentation, Ms. Curtis; is that correct?

1	MS. CURTIS: Yes.
2	THE COURT: That gives you the opportunity to respond
3	to any of the arguments that you've heard regarding why your
4	case why your cause of action should be dismissed. If you
5	want to stand at the table, that's fine, but just pull the mike
6	up, so that we can hear you.
7	And, first of all, just to get this clear, so I
8	understand, are you a licensed attorney?
9	MS. CURTIS: No, sir.
10	THE COURT: Okay. So, you're just an individual
11	representing yourself and you filed this law enforcement on
12	behalf of yourself?
13	MS. CURTIS: Yes, I did.
14	THE COURT: Very well. You may proceed.
15	MS. CURTIS: I'd like for Mr. Munson to respond to
16	these, if it's okay.
17	THE COURT: Okay. Now, Mr. Munson, are you an
18	attorney?
19	MR. MUNSON: No, sir.
20	THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Munson cannot represent you.
21	He's not an attorney. And so to the extent that there is a
22	response by you, it has to come from you. And Mr. Munson, to
23	the extent that he has causes of action, he can assert those or
24	respond to those on his own behalf, but he's not allowed to
25	speak for you. Do you understand?

MS. CURTIS: 1 Yes. 2 THE COURT: All right. So with that being said, do you have anything you wish to say to me? 3 MS. CURTIS: Okay. May I wait until he's done? 4 5 THE COURT: Yes. 6 MS. CURTIS: Okay. 7 THE COURT: And you're Mr. Munson? 8 MR. MUNSON: Yes, sir, I am. THE COURT: And, Mr. Munson, you're going to come up 9 to the podium. Very well. And you told me you're not an 10 11 attorney, correct? 12 MR. MUNSON: No, sir. THE COURT: And you're representing yourself in this 13 14 matter? 15 MR. MUNSON: Yes, sir. THE COURT: Very well. 16 I'm representing myself, and I'm a 17 MR. MUNSON: private attorney general representing the public interests as 18 19 well. THE COURT: What does that mean, a private attorney 20 21 general? 22 Well, the RICO statutes under 1964(c) MR. MUNSON: provide a private cause of action for private plaintiffs. 1963 23 is the cause of action for public prosecutors. 24 The Congress 25 when they drafted the RICO statutes mentioned in the

1 legislative committee reports, that they didn't believe that -2 and it's in all kinds of case law, that they didn't believe
3 that the public prosecutor resources were adequate to address
4 organized crime. They didn't say why they didn't think they
5 were adequate, and I'm not going to address those issues.

6 *THE COURT:* But that's what your explanation as to 7 what private attorney general is for --

8 MR. MUNSON: A private attorney general is someone who 9 advances a matter in the public interest.

10 *THE COURT:* All right. So, now in regards to the 11 arguments articulated on behalf of the defendants who are 12 seeking motions to dismiss, what is your response on behalf of 13 yourself, not on behalf of Ms. Curtis, because you cannot 14 represent --

MR. MUNSON: I'm aware of that. Okay.

THE COURT: Okay.

15

16

17 MR. MUNSON: But they are the same issues, technically
18 speaking.

19 THE COURT: Very well.

20 MR. MUNSON: All of these defendants have entered 21 plenary admissions in this matter, and you've heard them all 22 repeat them today. They insist a probate matter, that this 23 arises from a probate matter. *Curtis v. Brunsting* in the Fifth 24 Circuit, that's -- I'm been in Texas for five years. And when 25 I see the Brunsting Trust, there is no probate. If we read the

wills, which none of these defendants who claim probate even 1 2 bother to do, you'll find out that everything that the will authorized to be done was completed five days before the 3 so-called probate matter was filed. The inventory was 4 5 submitted on April 4th. It was approved and filed with a drop order on April 5th. Five days later, the same day Judge Hoyt 6 issued an injunction to Mrs. Curtis in the probate -- in the 7 8 trust related case in the federal court, Bobbie Bayless filed 9 her probate matter.

Now, nothing in the so-called probate matter 10 addresses anything but the trust, and none of the claims 11 12 contained in the so-called probate matter are contained in the list of inventory and assets. There is no probate matter. 13 14 *Curtis v. Brunsting* is related to the Brunsting Trust. It is 15 not property belonging to the estate of Nelva Brunsting or Elmer Brunsting. That was settled by the Fifth Circuit Court 16 17 of Appeals. And I don't think we're going against the Fifth Circuit in regard to that judgment in this case. 18

19 I'm not here to try the case, but there is no
20 probate matter, because there's no jurisdiction in the probate
21 court. We have two problems with 12(b)(6) and 12(b)(1). The
22 first one is 12(b)(6) relies upon --

23 THE COURT REPORTER: Can you slow down?
 24 MR. MUNSON: Okay. Have to rely upon the statement of
 25 facts made in the complaint. All of the defendants offer a

contrary view of the facts. They're not allowed to do that
 under 12(b)(6). They can do that under a factual challenge
 under 12(b)(1), but they have to support it with affidavits and
 documents outside the record. They do none of those things.

5 So, the whole idea of immunity is based upon subject matter jurisdiction. Nothing in the probate court 6 7 involved anything but the Brunsting Trust. If you were to ask 8 these defendants to identify a probate claim pending in the 9 probate matter, the only thing that comes out of their mouth is The trust is not an asset belonging to the estate. I 10 trust. have no have interest in the probate. There was no probate. 11 12 It was completed before the probate matter was filed. I have no interest in the trust. However, I have an interest in my 13 14 household.

15 Plaintiff Curtis and I are domestic partners. And this case is robbing assets from my home and redirecting 16 them to courts in Texas in order for her to defend her property 17 18 interest. It is not an expectancy. It is a property right. 19 The expectancies come from the estate. Now, I heard one of the 20 lawyers mention Foster (phonetic). There was a will challenge There's no will challenge in the Brunsting case. 21 in Foster. 22 If you read the wills, none of the five Brunstings are heirs to 23 Only the trust is an heir to the estate. the estate. The Fifth Circuit did read the will. But none of these defendants 24 25 in their 200 some pages of motions to dismiss, they all say

probate matter, probate matter, probate matter. Not one of
 them mentions the will. The reason for that is to give the lie
 to the claim that it's a probate matter.

They also claim they have no idea what *Curtis v*. 4 5 Brunsting is. Curtis v. Brunsting is the case that was in possession of the Brunsting Trust, beginning on 2-12-20 --6 7 2-27-2012 and continuing until this remand to the so-called 8 probate matter. You cannot remand a plaintiff for consolidation with a case where she is a defendant. Dicey's 9 rules of parties to action number five says that a plaintiff 10 cannot be a defendant in the same action. 11

Bobbie Bayless named plaintiff Curtis a defendant in the probate matter. The whole notion that she could be remanded to probate to consolidate with Carl Brunsting in non-litigation, where she was a defendant, is a false thesis.

17 Under 12(b)(6) the Court is compelled to accept the facts in the complaint. Under 12(b)(1), they can't 18 19 challenge those facts without support. They've done neither 20 one of those. And yet they come in here insisting a completely different set of facts. Their immunity claims are based upon 21 22 the notion of subject matter jurisdiction. There is no subject 23 matter jurisdiction over the Brunsting Trust in the probate court. The Fifth Circuit is controlling. They address that. 24 25 It's only seven pages. But I don't think any of these people

ever read it. I'm not sure they've ever read anything, because
 they keep repeating themselves like they're broken records.
 And yet, there is no probate matter.

There was never about a probate matter after the 4 5 inventory and listed claims were submitted and the matter In fact, it was a year later that the Brunsting case 6 dropped. 7 was remanded to probate and suddenly became the estate of Nelva 8 Brunsting, which the Fifth Circuit said it's not. It was six months later that Carl Brunsting applied for letters 9 testamentary the second time. That's October 17th, 2014. 10 So when it was filed, he filed it individually, but he has no 11 standing as an heir of the estate and as executor for the 12 estate, which was closed, and he had no letters testamentary 13 14 for.

15 This is all just one big scam from chumming to bring in people who want to protect their assets, to promising 16 them peace of mind, and then deciding which ones would be 17 subject to redirection to the probate for now to be looted. 18 19 And the defendants all object to the record of proceedings. 20 But the record of proceedings is conclusive. We believe that on the record this case is subject to -- you know, is ripe for 21 22 summary judgment on the pleadings, but we also know there is 23 more that we can obtain by discovery.

24There's lots of obfuscation in terms of the25accounting for the Brunsting Trust. All of these lawyers have

gotten in the way. And if we look at the transcript of the 1 2 March 9th, I was personally present and witnessed that little charade, I was so offended by the conduct. These grinning 3 jackals, like we're going to rip you off and what are you going 4 5 to do about it. That's what your misplaced notions of immunity have generated, a bunch of people who have no concern for the 6 administration of justice or the rule of law, and that's what 7 8 this case is about. It's about public corruption, and that's why I'm here as a private attorney general. 9 THE COURT: I only have one question. You stated that 10 11 you were a domestic partner to Ms. Curtis? 12 MR. MUNSON: Yes. THE COURT: As to a domestic partner, what legal 13 14 rights under Texas law does that give you a connection with the 15 issues in this case? I just want to -- because I assume when you say "domestic partner," you didn't use the word "husband" 16 17 or --18 MR. MUNSON: No, or spouse. 19 THE COURT: Or spouse. 20 MR. MUNSON: No. THE COURT: You just said "domestic." So, what legal 21 rights does that give you? 22 23 MR. MUNSON: I believe I addressed that in the Docket 24 89, where I mentioned Judiciary Rule 1927. It's codified at 28 25 U.S.C. 1927. And it gives you three instances in which

ROA.17-20360.3419

Mrs. Curtis is entitled to compensation for her expenses. 1 2 Okay? And I have been asked by Mrs. Curtis to step in as act as the trust protector and to assist her in trying to figure 3 out this very, very intentionally convoluted case. 4 I mean, 5 they made a mess of the finances, claimed to have them straightened out and then dumped everything in a big box for --6 7 THE COURT: Hold on. Because I want to make sure 8 we're --9 MR. MUNSON: Okay. THE COURT: -- we're on the same page. 10 MR. MUNSON: Okay. 11 12 THE COURT: You acknowledged early on before you began your remarks, that you cannot represent -- legally represent 13 Ms. Curtis, only an attorney can do that or only Ms. Curtis can 14 15 do that. MR. MUNSON: Yes -- well --16 17 THE COURT: Let me finish. In connection with your interest in -- if I heard you correctly, and correct me if 18 19 I'm wrong, you stated that you were a domestic partner to Ms. Curtis. And I'm trying to get an understanding as to what 20 21 you are asserting by --MR. MUNSON: We have shared finances. 22 23 THE COURT: Don't interrupt me --MR. MUNSON: Sorry. 24 25 THE COURT: -- by asserting that you are a domestic

1 partner to Ms. Curtis. So, what --

MR. MUNSON: We have a joint household. We have joined financial considerations. I don't handle any of the finances. I have renters, but I don't collect any of the rents. I have Mrs. Curtis do all of that. Okay? She's my partner. She handles that part of it. I'm a saxophone player. *THE COURT:* When you say "partner" --

8 MR. MUNSON: Yes, domestic partner. We sleep in the 9 same bed. We live together.

10 *THE COURT:* Well, I'm not trying to get that familiar. 11 But partner also has a commercial context to it. So, you're 12 not business partners?

13 MR. MUNSON: No, no, no, not specifically. We do have 14 some plans that are being interfered with, but we're not able 15 to pursue those at the moment.

16

THE COURT: Okay. Now I understand. Thank you, sir.

17 MR. MUNSON: And as far as these attorneys claiming that no one can assist without -- I think it was Docket Entry 18 19 90, the one -- the document filed untimely, just before this hearing, where they bring up the mention of this unlicensed 20 practice of law. I would love to hear a definition of that, as 21 well as a definition of probate from these defendants. Because 22 my understanding is that I do have standing. And I'm relying 23 on Supreme Court precedent. I did draft all of the drafts for 24 25 all of the motions in this case, because Mrs. Curtis works in

the daytime. So, I've been involved in this for five years.
 I've had my time redirected to this matter, and it is all one
 big public corruption fraud.

THE COURT: Thank you, sir.

Ms. Curtis?

4

5

6 *MS. CURTIS:* I just know that I'm here today because 7 all of these people are standing between me and my property. 8 And I've been trying to get it and get information about it 9 since right after my mother passed away on November 11th, 2011. 10 As far as I'm concerned, all five of the Brunsting siblings are 11 victims here, because there's attorneys here that have extended 12 them credit to continue to avoid their responsibility.

I was directed to hire an attorney, because my 13 14 domestic partner was in a coma and I could not prepare for a 15 hearing in October of 2013 properly. So, I failed miserably, and Judge Hoyt directed me to hire an attorney so the discovery 16 process could go forward. And after he got out of the 17 hospital, it was a couple of months before he could even think 18 19 straight. When you have open heart surgery, it's a serious matter. And we looked high and low to find an attorney to 20 represent me, and couldn't until finally we contacted 21 Mr. Ostrom, who convinced us that he would be the person to 22 23 take this over and immediately proceeded to do things against my instructions, not keep me informed of what was going on and 24 then somehow managed to get me out of the federal court into 25

the probate court where there is no jurisdiction and there
 wasn't.

3	So, I was stuck in a nightmare for two and a half
4	years and I couldn't get out. I tried to file summary judgment
5	years and I couldn't get out. I tried to file summary judgment and declaratory judgment motions, which I filed, but I couldn't
6	get a hearing for those. But they could hear whether they were going to have another mediation, so that they could unentrench
7	going to have another mediation, so that they could unentrench
8	me from my belief that this property belonged to me and they
9	were holding it. So, that's why I'm here today.

10 Mr. Munson has been helping me since the very 11 beginning. I've known him for almost ten years now, and that 12 was my only choice.

THE COURT: The defendants in this case have made some 13 14 very specific legal arguments as to why your case should be dismissed as to their various clients, from judicial immunity 15 to failure to state a claim and a host of issue legal issues 16 17 that you heard in between. So, in regards to a response to those specific legal assertions by these defendants, judicial 18 19 immunity, failure to state a claim, do you have any specific 20 response other than what you've put on paper already?

MS. CURTIS: Well, I believe that if there's no jurisdiction, there are no judges, there are no lawyers, and there is no litigation. And if there is no litigation, then there is no immunity. And I don't believe that there is litigation relating to the trust in Probate Court No. 4.

Although, the report from Greg Lester, which was supposed to 1 2 evaluate the merits of the claims in state court, said nothing about the estate of Nelva Brunsting. All they talked about is 3 the trust and how Ms. Curtis and her brother Carl are going to 4 5 be disinherited by the no contest clause in this mysterious qualified beneficiary designation, that they can't even produce 6 7 the original signed document of and for which there are three 8 different signature pages.

9 So, I'm here because I was at wit's end. I was 10 stuck in probate court and being pushed towards a mediation 11 where they were going to unentrench me from going after what 12 belongs to me, what my parents gave to me that is mine now and 13 they're holding it.

14 THE COURT: Thank you. And just by way of 15 housekeeping, just I'm trying to get a better sense of the 16 players on the chess board, are you related to these two ladies 17 over here?

18 MS. CURTIS: These are my two youngest sisters. 19 Okay. And so --THE COURT: Carl is my brother, who was represented 20 MS. CURTIS: by Bobbie Bayless. 21 22 THE COURT: Is he here? MS. CURTIS: 23 No. 24 THE COURT: Okay. So, you have -- all right. Very 25 well. Thank you.

What I would like to do -- what I'm going to do, 1 2 I'm going to wade into the specific motions to dismiss, to get an understanding as to who is going to remain in this case, 3 maybe none of you, maybe all of you, I don't know. 4 I'm qoing 5 to -- I wanted to hear your oral arguments. And you cited some additional considerations for me to look at, and so I'm going 6 7 to do that. Once I made a determination as to what motions to dismiss -- how to dispose of them, being granted, being denied, 8 9 then we can, if necessary, make a plan going forward as far as some type of managed discovery. Right now I think that would 10 be unwielding given the number of players on this chess board 11 and also given the fact that some of you may not be here --12 some of the defendants may not be here. Some of the -- you 13 14 know, one of the ones that I was troubled by, and I'm going to 15 get a better explanation for it -- and obviously this is oral argument and everything is short-circuited to that, but the 16 court reporter. And to the extent that someone is sitting 17 there just taking down a record, I'm not sure of the legal 18 19 causes of action to which that person may have subjected 20 himself. And as to some of the attorneys, I'll look at that, as well as the judges, that's separate and apart. But, for 21 22 instance, the court reporter, who was a substitute court reporter, as described, just sticks out, and I just wanted to 23 24 see exactly what his involvement was in the case. No need to 25 comment.

And so I just need to dive -- lawyers, 1 2 representatives say something in court and my review may reveal a different determination, and so that's what I need to do. 3 But because of that alert going off, that maybe there's someone 4 who doesn't belong here, we're going to keep -- we're going to 5 hold off on discovery. Because I don't want people to 6 7 participate in discovery if they're not going to be here for 8 the long-haul. I think that manages the cost for everyone and conserves resources for the individual clients. 9 So, I think that's the best way to proceed. 10

11 Now, having said that, that puts on me a burden of being timely and making sure that these motions to dismiss 12 are disposed of such that the plaintiffs, if this case goes 13 14 forward, are entitled to some type of discovery for the 15 remaining defendants on the causes of actions that remain. And, so, we cannot delay that process forever, if it's going to 16 17 So, I will endeavor to be efficient as I can in qo forward. getting these motions to dismiss disposed of, so we'll know 18 19 who's left on the board, and then we can move forward with some type of managed discovery plan that makes sense. 20 That's what 21 I'm going to do.

I assume, before I walked out here, that that covered all of the motions to dismiss. Were there any other motions to dismiss that were not addressed today? All right. Are there any other motions that were not

addressed today that needed to be addressed? 1 2 Mr. Munson, Ms. Curtis, any other motions, pending motions on my docket? All right. 3 4 So let me again address the motions that have 5 been presented. Anything else that we need to address before we adjourn today, starting on my right? 6 7 MR. ABRAMS: No, Your Honor. 8 THE COURT: No? Well, I do have this question. My name 9 MS. BAYLESS: came up a lot more than I expected it to in this hearing, and 10 some things were said which I did not realize were allegations, 11 this allegation that there's no probate proceeding when there 12 is. I don't know if the Court wants to entertain some brief --13 14 THE COURT: No. 15 MS. BAYLESS: Okay. THE COURT: I don't want any additional briefing. 16 MS. BAYLESS: All right. Well, thank you, Your Honor. 17 THE COURT: To the extent that I dig into this and I 18 19 determine that additional briefing is necessary on a specific point, my clerk will contact you and ask for it. But as a 20 general rule, I don't want you to submit additional briefing on 21 what you've already briefed. There may be something that I'll 22 23 dig into that I will ask for additional briefing on, but as of right now, there's no need to submit additional briefing. 24 25 Anything else from this side?

MR. HARRELL: No, Your Honor. 1 2 THE COURT: Very well. 3 MS. BECKMAN HEDGE: Nothing, Your Honor. THE COURT: Ms. Curtis, anything else? 4 5 MS. CURTIS: No, Your Honor. 6 THE COURT: Mr. Munson? 7 MR. MUNSON: I would like leave, sir -- I'm sorry. Ι 8 would like leave to file a brief on the public attorney 9 general. THE COURT: Not necessary. During your presentation 10 you made some specific cites. We have a record. So, I will 11 If it's turns out that I have additional 12 check that. questions, I will have my clerk contact you for additional 13 14 information. Anything else, Mr. Munson? 15 MR. MUNSON: Yeah, we do have a private attorney general statute in California. It's government code -- it's 16 California Business and Professions Code 17204 and 17535, which 17 also address the issues. 18 19 THE COURT: So, in regard -- and since you cited that to me, I'm just going to ask the question, we're sitting in a 20 Federal District Court in Texas. How does the California 21 22 statute work in this case? 23 MR. MUNSON: It mimics the Supreme Court on the 24 subject. 25 THE COURT: Okay. Very well.

Anything else, issues from this side of the room
 that the Court needs to be aware of before we adjourn? Yes,
 ma'am.

MS. AMY BRUNSTING: Amy Brunsting. I just wanted to
clarify how many siblings were involved. Candy is the oldest.
There's another one --

7THE COURT REPORTER:Can she use the microphone?8THE COURT:Hold on.Use the microphone.

9 MS. AMY BRUNSTING: Sorry. There's five siblings in
10 our family. Candy is the oldest. Carole Brunsting is next.
11 Carl Brunsting is the third. I'm the fourth, Amy Brunsting,
12 and Anita Brunsting. So, we're the five siblings. I think
13 only four of them were mentioned. Just clarity.

THE COURT: You said Candace Brunsting?

15 MS. AMY BRUNSTING: Candace -- Candy Curtis, I'm 16 sorry.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. Very well. Thank you.

18 Any other clarifications, any other additional19 information that I need? Over there?

20 *MR. MUNSON:* Standing of a private attorney general 21 under civil rights is different than under RICO. RICO is the 22 only situation where a private attorney general does not also 23 have to be an attorney.

THE COURT: Thank you, sir.

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All right. We are adjourned. You are excused.

1	Happy holidays to you.
2	(Concluded at 1:00 p.m.)
3	* * *
4	I certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript from the
5	record of proceedings in the above-entitled cause, to the best
6	of my ability.
7	
8	/s/ $Metroper$ $6-27-2017$ Kathy L. MetzgerDate
9	Official Court Reporter
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