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1	REPORTER'S RECORD		
2	VOLUME 1 OF 1		
3	COURT CAUSE NO. 412.249-401		
4	APPELLATE NO.		
5	THE ESTATE OF:  NELVA E. BRUNSTING,  NUMBER 4 (FOUR) OF		
6	DECEASED ) HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS		
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10	* * * * * * * * * * * *		
11	MOTIONS HEARING		
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18	On the 9th day of December, 2014, the following		
19	proceedings came to be heard in the above-entitled and		
20	numbered cause before the Honorable Christine Butts		
21	Judge of Probate Court No. 4, held in Houston, Harris		
22	County, Texas:		
23			
24	Proceedings reported by Machine Shorthand		
25			

#### 1 A-P-P-E-A-R-A-N-C-E-S: 2 Mr. Neal E. Spielman Mr. Jason B. Ostrom Griffin & Matthews Attorney at Law Attorney at Law 3 SBN 24027710 SBN 00794678 5020 Montrose Blvd. 4 1155 Dairy Ashford Suite 310. Suite 300 Houston, Texas 77006 Houston, Texas 77079 713.863.8891 281.870.1124 6 ATTORNEY FOR: ATTORNEY FOR: AMY BRUNSTING CANDACE CURTIS 7 8 Ms. Bobbie G. Bayless Ms. Darlene Payne Smith Bayless & Stokes Crain, Caton & James Attorney at Law Attorney at Law SBN 01940600 SBN 18643525 10 2931 Ferndale Five Houston Center Houston, Texas 77098 1400 McKinney St. 11 713.522.2224 Suite 1700 Houston, Texas 77010 12 713.658.2323 ATTORNEY FOR: ATTORNEY FOR: CARL H. BRUNSTING 13 CAROLE ANN BRUNSTING 14 Mr. Brad Featherston The Mendel Law Firm, L.P. 15 Attorney at Law SBN 24038892 16 1155 Dairy Ashford Suite 104 17 Houston, Texas 77079 281.759.3213 18 19 ATTORNEY FOR: ANITA K. BRUNSTING 20 21 22 23 24

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1	VOLUME 1	
2	(MOTIONS HEARING) December 9, 2014 Page	Vol.
3	PROCEEDINGS4	1
4	,	1
5		1 1
6	Page COURT'S RULING30	Vol. 1
7	COURT REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE39	1
8		
9		
10		
11		
12		
13		
14		
15		
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   December 9, 2014
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                          PROCEEDINGS
 3
                  THE COURT: Calling to order Cause Number
    412.249 in the 401.
 4
 5
                  We're here on The Estate of Nelva
 6
   Brunsting. And if you would, perhaps, starting with Ms.
   Smith, just make announcements - your name, who you
 7
   represent, and we'll just go along counsel table.
 8
 9
                  MS. SMITH: Darlene Payne Smith for Carole
   Brunsting, and Carole Brunsting is present.
10
11
                  MS. BAYLESS: Bobbie Bayless on behalf of
   Carl Brunsting.
12
                  MR. OSTROM: Jason Ostrom on behalf of
13
   Candy Curtis.
14
15
                  MR. SPIELMAN: Neal Spielman on behalf of
   Amy Brunsting.
16
                  MR. FEATHERSTON: Brad Featherston on
17
   behalf of Anita Brunsting.
18
                  THE COURT: And, I'm sorry, you're
19
   representing Amy?
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21
                  MR. SPIELMAN: Yes, Your Honor. In fact,
   we filed our notice of appearance yesterday afternoon.
22
   And when I left the office, we had the fax cover page to
23
    everybody, but we hadn't gotten the e-file confirmation
24
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25

yet.

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                  THE COURT: Okay. And it didn't make it
   to my file so. Well welcome. And what is your name?
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                  MR. SPIELMAN: Neal Spielman.
 3
 4
                  THE COURT: Okay. Will you spell your
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    last name for me?
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                  MR. SPIELMAN: S-P-I-E-L-M-A-N.
                  THE COURT: Okay. We're here on three
 7
 8
    things:
                  Number one, Candace's motion for
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    distribution of trust funds.
10
                  Number two, Carl Brunsting's motion for
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    distribution of trust funds.
12
                  And finally, Carl Brunsting's motion to
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   modify preliminary injunction.
14
15
                  And so, I guess it makes sense to start
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   with Mr. Ostrom.
17
                    ARGUMENT BY MR. OSTROM:
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                  MR. OSTROM: Sure, Your Honor, I'll be
19
   happy to approach.
20
                  Your Honor, I want to give the Court some
   procedural background.
21
22
                  We really have two proceedings in front of
23
   you right now as counsel sitting here at this table.
    The first proceeding, I was not involved in; and this
24
   was an action brought by Ms. Bayless' client in relation
25
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part of this estate. Ms. Bayless' client is the executor of Ms. Brunsting's estate, and she has brought claims against Anita and Amy alleging various breaches on their part in relation to the trust that we're discussing today.

The other proceeding was a proceeding that was filed in federal court. This was a proceeding initiated by my client, pro se, in federal court. In that lawsuit, my client sued Anita and Amy for breaches of trust relating to some sub trusts that were created as a result of -- or should have been created as a result of Nelva's death and that she was a beneficiary of. In that action, the federal judge filed a -- or signed an order transferring that cause to this court.

My understanding, from trying to work within the Clerk's Office here and the Clerk's Office in federal court, is that the physical file has not landed on your desk yet. And we are still trying to work through that process. In essence, what we're being told, because the two systems cannot speak electronically to each other, they can't just transfer the file. I physically have to request documents that they certify. Then I have to go file it with the clerk here to view the file. And we're talking about a case

that has a long history, and it actually went up to the Fifth Circuit. Judge Hoyt was reversed and came back down and is pending in front of him.

In that proceeding, the judge issued a preliminary injunction. And I don't know if this Court's seen that injunction. I've got copies here if you'd like to see it. It was attached to one of Ms. Bayless' files. That injunction removed all the power from the trustees to make any financial decisions regarding the trust. The specific language, so that there was no confusion, it says, "In essence, all transactions of financial nature shall require preapproval of the Court pending a resolution of disputes between the parties in this case." That's the language that --

THE COURT: And what page was that?

MR. OSTROM: That's on the fifth page of the Memorandum And Order Of Preliminary Injunction.

And, in essence, the Court has stopped the trustees from taking any action. This is important because of one of the objections that was asserted to our motion requesting fees which is the Di Portanova case. I want to use this language to point out the distinction with Di Portanova.

Di Portanova involved a court substituting

discretion for the trustees when the trustees aren't given the ability to exercise discretion. That's not what's happened here.

What's happened here is the Court has made preliminary findings that Amy and Anita had failed to act in accordance with the trust. They need to be prohibited from taking any further action with regards to the trust until such time the case is resolved.

So, we didn't seek approval from Anita or Amy to allow our client to receive a distribution from the trust; in fact, the parties - and Mr. Featherston is aware of this - but the parties had already developed a process with prior counsel going to the Court and asking for attorneys fees.

Judge Hoyt has already entered an order once providing a 5,000-dollar attorney fee advance to my side along with a 5,000-dollar attorney fee advance to the trustee. The -- and then you had the experience of being in front of the trustee's prior counsel, Maureen McCutchen, when she asked you to go ahead and make a ruling allowing a distribution to pay the taxes associated with the real estate and enter into this lease arrangement on the Iowa farm property.

So, the parties have already begun and consented to this order and taking actions in this order

in both of the cause numbers even though this order was only entered in my case. I don't believe this Court has entered an order to this effect as related to Ms.

Bayless' case.

So, we have two actions. And my client is here asking, now, pursuant to this order, for relief which is the payment of her attorney's fees.

Since that 5,000-dollar payment, we received no additional payments for attorney's fees.

Aside from -- we've been to mediation, and we couldn't get the case resolved in mediation.

Aside from a claim that my client's lawsuit is a violation of the intererim clause, which I'll address, there is no other grounds to suggest that my client should not be entitled to the benefits of the trusts that were created for her and her siblings.

The intererim clause, I think, is a grasping-at-straws prohibition.

This Court is probably very familiar with the law surrounding intererim clauses.

An intererim clause only appears in what I'm going to call the "QBD". It does not appear in the initial trust instrument that my client is not objecting to or the initial trust instrument that sets up the sub trust that my client's beneficiary of.

The intererim clause only appears in the document that my client wishes to challenge. The document that my client wishes to challenge is referenced as a "QBD". This is -- this was, in our position, an attempt to amend a trust that was otherwise irrevocable.

THE COURT: You're calling it a "QBD"; is that an acronym for --

MR. OSTROM: Qualified Beneficiary Designation.

THE COURT: Okay. And so what about the no-contest of our trust clause in the restatement?

MR. OSTROM: We don't challenge that trust. So, that trust -- we've got no complaints about the original trust, the restated trust or the sub trusts that were created by the restated trust. All the actions that Nelva and Elmer took together during their lifetime, we don't have complaints of -- over; it is what happens after Elmer passes away. After he dies, it's our position that that trust becomes irrevocable, and it's only certain things that any of the grantor and/or trustee can do at that stage.

What happens is after Elmer's death, this
Qualified Beneficiary Designation was done which
purports to execute the disclaimer language in the

trust. They're trying to say this is a disclaimer.

That's going to be their legal position. It's our position that this isn't a disclaimer - it's a wholesale amendment of the trust. It changes dispositive schemes, it adds intererim clauses, it appoints a trust protector that wasn't found in the original trust agreement. In fact, it contains language that speaks in the terms of an amendment to the trust.

THE COURT: I don't have any of that in my file.

MR. OSTROM: Your Honor, you don't because that is part of the file that we're trying to get over to you. These are arguments that I've raised in a declaratory judgment action in relation to this document, okay. But it is, it is an issue I wanted to discuss because that's the sole basis of our intererim challenge is - are we in violation of the terms of the trust by challenging this document that we believe, legally, doesn't have -- isn't grounded? I bring this up because that's the only basis to deny any relief for my client as it relates to this trust. She's not been accused of stealing or improperly managing these assets. She wasn't in charge of any of these assets.

Mainly, what we're trying to do is get her some relief on these attorneys fees that she's now

obligated to pay.

The said Article 10 Section 10 in the trust that we have not challenged, not the QBD amendment, but the Article 10 Section F and the trust says that there is going to be "no limitations are to be placed upon the beneficiary regarding withdrawals from his respective trust shares."

And further on in Section 10, it's creating those sub trusts. There is no language in there that puts in place a spend thrift provision. I don't think that a spend thrift provision is applicable because this is my client requesting a distribution of these funds to pay her attorney. This isn't me as a creditor coming after the trust trying to force the trust to pay when my client won't. We are doing this on behalf of our client so that she will have the funds necessary to pursue these actions that at least a federal court judge believed had some merit and authorized, on prior occasion, the distribution of attorneys fees.

So, for that -- for those reasons, we'd ask that this Court continue the practice that was started by Judge Hoyt, review our attorneys fees as submitted - I think we submitted some billing statements in camera - and make a fair and equitable decision as to

the distribution of those fees.

Your Honor, we would ask that if the Court's uncomfortable, it could just reserve how that's allocated at this point. I mean, I think you're going to hear from other counsel that these fees ultimately are going to be allocated somewhere at the end of this day.

Now, if the Court is uncomfortable allocating it to any one party - that's fine - or if the Court can allocate it to Candy's trust, the provision, and we're comfortable with that as well. But we believe that the Court does have the authority to do this in keeping with Judge Hoyt's prior order. And we'd ask for an award of the attorney fees as we previously submitted.

THE COURT: Okay. Let me read Judge Hoyt's order carefully again.

It specifically carves out income received for the benefit of the trust beneficiary. Does that -- are those income distributions being made directly to the beneficiary or simply deposited into the trust account?

MR. OSTROM: They're just being deposited into -- they should be, according to this order, deposited into a trust account that's allocated for the

beneficiaries. I think right now, all they're doing is being deposited in a trust account; is that right, Bobbie?

MS. BAYLESS: As far as I know.

MR. OSTROM: My understanding.

THE COURT: One of my concerns is characterizing these attorney fees as somehow the health, education, maintenance and support of the beneficiary. That's the HEMS standard, and all the distributions need to meet that standard, right?

MR. OSTROM: You know, I don't -- I didn't see that in their respective trusts. So, in their sub trusts, I didn't pick up a HEMS standard. The language that I was regarding on is that there weren't going to be limitations placed on beneficiaries regarding withdrawals from their respective shares. And I don't -- I'm sorry, I don't have the trust instrument in front of me right now. I'll be happy to go back and check that standard. The -- I think this is clearly for the benefit and support of Ms. Curtis.

If this lawsuit is not brought or if she doesn't bring these claims and challenge this QBD, the Qualified Beneficiary Designation, it would, in essence, take the control of the trust away from her, put it with Anita and Amy as her trustees, individuals who have --

who the court-appointed master in federal court have already found have unequitably distributed properties.

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So, the master's finding in federal court went through what Anita and Amy did as trustees -- or really, not Amy - Amy hadn't taken any action yet as trustee - what Anita did as a trustee. And there were irregularities in her disbursements of those funds. She paid, she paid her personal credit cards with trust assets. She made distributions to her children for education and a vehicle. That was on top of trust fund fees that she was paying to herself and distributions of stock shares that came out of the trust that she had no authority under the trust instrument to make.

So, if Carole -- if my client isn't permitted to obtain funds to free herself from the control of Anita and Amy as trustees, she's, in essence, not able to defend, one, the wrongs that have occurred to her trust and protect her own -- the use of this property moving forward because they will, in essence, be her trustees.

THE COURT: Okay. Well I'm still -- I mean, I understand that, and I believe that's, you know, may be true - she has no other resources of -- she has no other resources. But I'm still bound by the language of the trust which -- I mean, the way I read it, and you

can correct me, and I'll hand you this trust, but it, it really sets out, clearly, that distributions are to be made to Candace for her health, education, maintenance and support. It does give her a general testamentary power of appointment where she has a lot more freedom, but that's only when she passes away.

And the other thing that's a sticking point for me is the no-contest clause which, though I'm not necessarily reading this as a contest to this particular trust, it's a contest to a subsequent amendment or disclaimer, whatever you're calling it; but it still says that founders do not -- and, founders, I guess they mean by "founders" or "settlers" or "trustors" "do not want to burden this trust with the cost of a litigated proceeding to resolve questions of law or fact unless the proceeding is originated by the trustee or with the trustee's written permission."

So, I mean, I just -- it's really clear

Mom and Dad are saying, we don't want our kids to fight,

and we're not going to allow our estate to be fettered

away by paying for that fight.

MR. OSTROM: And I don't disagree that that's what Mom and Dad would like to have had happened, but I'm almost certain that Mom and Dad weren't going to consent to \$300,000 worth of Exxon stock being sent

without following the terms of the trust.

I'm certain that Mom and Dad didn't believe that Amy -- or that Anita would not follow the terms of the trust. And they couldn't have foreseen in their, at least Elmer couldn't have, in that no-contest provision, that after he dies, and this trust is supposed to be irrevocable, that they decide to go enter into new agreements.

Elmer, who is the grantor under that initial no-contest provision would have been -- couldn't have foreseen what his wife would do to make an otherwise irrevocable trust to change it.

Additionally, while those are noble intentions, Your Honor, you and I both know that whether we prevail or not, we can be relieved of our obligations under violation of the no-contest clause just by showing a good faith in our position as it relates to challenging the instrument.

THE COURT: And I'm not even getting that far down the road. I'm just -- I'm looking at -- this sentence just has -- happened to be in the intererim clause in this trust. And so I'm not even questioning whether or not this violates that clause. But what I am saying is that as part of that clause, then -- I mean, just to be clear, we'll call them, "Mom and Dad." They

said that they don't want any of the trust assets to be used unless the trust -- to pay attorney fees unless the trustee consents to that.

So, for me, that's, that's a problem. And everyday-people are faced -- I mean, one of the biggest problems with the American judicial system is that people are often unable to pursue wrongdoings against them because they can't afford to hire a lawyer, and this is one of those cases. And I'm not sure that going against what the trustee or what the trust terms are and allowing your client to pay their lawyer, that puts -- I mean, if it was an advance, you know, and you can make an argument that it was for her health, education, maintenance and support --

MR. OSTROM: Going back to the maintenance issue, I think it absolutely is. She's going to use resources, one way or another, trying to pay me. Those are her resources. If she can't pay the -- if she can't pay the light bills, the food, the shelter, the -- those other items, it's not telling her she can't hire a lawyer. It's not saying she can't have that part of what she has to do to protect her assets. And this is her asset. She is the beneficiary of this trust. She invested with a beneficiary interest in this trust.

What's basically -- what I'm hearing is that, yes, you have this interest in this trust; you're the beneficiary; the trustee is the one that owes you the fiduciary obligation, but you can't use this money to protect yourself. You can't use this money as maintenance or support to make sure that the trustee who owes you the fiduciary obligations actually conforms with those fiduciary obligations. That's what -- that's -- it's not just they can't redress the wrong, it's saying there is no way that makes or support, which I think it does, contemplates the need to use those resources to help protect this asset.

And I would posit to this Court that she should be able to use these resources - her funds and her share of this estate - to hold her fiduciaries accountable. And I think that's exactly what Judge Hoyt saw when he started initiating and allowing the attorney's fees to get paid.

THE COURT: Let's keep all sidebar comments --

MS. SMITH: I'm shocked that we're here on the same case that he's never been involved in, and it's misstating everything that happened.

THE COURT: Well, you'll have your opportunity to speak. I just don't want -- you know,

we've got to keep a record here, and I want to keep it clean. Okay.

MR. OSTROM: That's all I have.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you, Mr. Ostrom.

Okay. I have a question.

I read the restatement of the trust, and I see where -- where was it? We had the trustees, and they were named: Carl and Amy. And somehow, Amy and Anita became trustees, and I never saw how that happened. Can someone answer that for me?

MR. OSTROM: Do you want to address that?

MS. BAYLESS: Sure.

Your Honor, when the Qualified Beneficiary Designation was signed shortly thereafter, Nelva resigned as Trustee, allegedly resigned as trustee, and appointed Anita as her successor trustee. And the Qualified Beneficiary Designation had changed the trustees to Anita and Amy once she was deceased.

My client became ill shortly before the Qualified Beneficiary Designation was signed and was not involved in a lot of what went on, but that's the chronology.

THE COURT: Okay. And so is the primary asset, in this estate, a qualified retirement plan?

MS. BAYLESS: I'm sorry?

THE COURT: Is the primary asset a qualified plan? So, this beneficiary -- Qualified Beneficiary Designation - I don't even know what that is.

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MS. BAYLESS: Yeah, it's a nomenclature I'm not really familiar with it either, but it's what the trust said could be done. It's basically a power of appointment, I think you would call it, but they call it a Qualified Beneficiary Designation. But the primary asset is the Iowa farm.

THE COURT: I see. Okay. So, we have some objections. Who would like to voice their objection first?

## ARGUMENT BY MS. BAYLESS:

 $$\operatorname{MS.}$$  BAYLESS: Let me say this and save time, Your Honor.

I filed the request -- my understanding is that the federal case was transferred to this Court with its order in place. Had it not been, I would have been seeking, from this Court, injunctive relief to keep everything frozen as had happened in federal court. So, that's -- and now that's gotten complicated because that file is not over here, and I understand that. But there are orders which Judge Hoyt said would remain in place during the transfer.

And my concern was that when Amy and Anita lost their last counsel, we had been led, and when I say "we," Mr. Ostrom and I, had been led to believe that they were in the process of obtaining counsel; and frankly, I was a little surprised there wasn't a substitution before the withdrawal.

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But my concern became when they didn't get counsel and didn't get counsel that we had two trustees floating around out here that were under injunctive orders that we couldn't really communicate with easily and that type of thing. So, that was the reason. And I didn't file a motion to remove them - I filed a motion to modify the injunctive relief so that we had somebody in control of the assets or in control of whoever was in control of the assets that could be monitored and we had a concern.

Initially, Anita obtained a new counsel, but it wasn't until yesterday that Amy obtained counsel.

But that was my concern, and so I don't intend --

THE COURT: So, you wish to withdraw that?

MS. BAYLESS: Yes.

THE COURT: Okay. So, we're left, really, with any objections to Candace's motion for distribution of trust funds.

MR. OSTROM: I think Ms. Bayless -- I

believe Ms. Bayless also requested a distribution as well.

2.3

Your Honor.

THE COURT: And we'll hear that, I just wanted -- if you want to go ahead and make your case and then we can -- the objections can be made to both requests for distributions? I mean, do you have an objection to that?

MR. FEATHERSTON: Seems like a logical way to proceed, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

# FURTHER ARGUMENT BY MS. BAYLESS:

MS. BAYLESS: And I can be very brief,

Frankly, my client has undertaken a number of steps -- undertook to pursue discovery, took depositions, obtained, personally, all of the trust records that we have now; initiated the probate proceedings so that there was a party that could proceed against the attorneys who prepared the documents. I mean, he's been doing a lot of stuff. He was not involved in the federal court case but watched as, both, Amy and Anita and Candy received the distribution for attorneys fees. So, at that point, we didn't know whether that would be a one-time distribution or whether it would be on an ongoing basis and be treated the same

way. It's obviously expensive litigation. And so to the extent parties are receiving distributions for base, and I don't question that that is -- may well be the proper thing to happen if this dispute is going to be sorted out properly, we didn't want to be continuing to stand on the sideline because he is belaboring more for much of what is going on, and he's not been doing that with trust resources.

So, when Mr. Ostrom filed another request for fees -- and, frankly, I told Mr. Ostrom when he did it the first time, that was going to be a bad precedent unless everybody was participating in that way. And so when he filed that again, I informed him that we were going to make a similar request because we didn't think one party alone should be receiving distributions for attorneys fees.

I'm not disputing that all of the parties probably need distributions for attorneys fees. And so rather than couching it as an objection to his request, I made my own request.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, let me just say -- I mean, in other fiduciary litigation cases that have involved trusts, we've always waited until the end to award attorney fees, and one of the reasons for that is because one of the factors that's required in making

an award of attorney fees is whether, you know, you kind of apply those fees to the, to the rules. And one of the tenants is those attorney fees have to be reasonable in relation to the, to the damages sought. And so here we're kind of flying blind. We've got attorney fees being requested, but we have -- I have no idea what the Iowa farm is, the value of it is. I have no idea what the damages could be. So, to say you're entitled to these fees without knowing all of those things, I just don't see how I can do that because I can do it at the end of the game when everything becomes clear, and I'm sitting there, you know, writing a decision. But until I know, I just feel like there are just a lot of things missing in my mind that would enable me to make a reasonable ruling as to the -- as to the reasonableness of the fees. Does that make any sense?

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MS. BAYLESS: Sure. Makes a lot of sense.

I mean, I just think that the difficulty that this case faces is there are some very complicated issues. Many of them are legal issues, and we may be able to resolve them through motions for summary judgment in a fairly short order which, I say "short order," you know, in the nature of litigation, you know, not tomorrow, of course. But -- and that may help. It might also help the Court with the issue of what's

reasonable -- or even, for example, I think one of the issues is going to be enforceability of the no-contest clause. I mean, if we deal with some of the legal issues - that may help.

My point is, in the filing, it's sort of acknowledging - yes, it's expensive litigation; and, yes, there are assets there which will ultimately be divided among the siblings. And the idea that they can't get that sorted out because of the legal expenses being more than they can bear without what they're entitled to from the trust, is also sort of illogical. But I certainly understand the process. I just don't want to be the only one who is sitting over here watching that happen.

And so to the extent the Court decided, well, we've got to figure out a way to systematically maybe not pay the fees but contribute to them or something, I want to be in that line. My client needs to be in that line. And to the extent the Court says, I'm not going to do that until the end of the case, I certainly understand why that might occur also.

But I do think there are some -- they're not all legal issues, but there are a lot of legal issues that are complicated legal issues, but they are issues that can be resolved without a trial. And then

that might narrow everyone's focus, and maybe we could then get it resolved at a mediation. We're just kind of throwing up everything in the air in mediation. It was, it was not a pretty sight. So, it might help to narrow some of those as well.

THE COURT: Well, is it -- would it be possible -- I'm completely sympathetic with this litigation going forward and attorneys being paid as it goes forward. I mean, I'm very sympathetic to your cause, Mr. Ostrom, it's just that I don't -- I would feel -- I would feel like I wasn't going out on a limb if everyone needs attorney fees, and you guys came up with some sort of way to agree on how those would be paid as the trust litigation progresses. I mean, I would be open to something like that.

MS. BAYLESS: Right. I sort of thought that was the direction we would head in because, frankly, when Mr. Ostrom got paid \$5,000 before, Amy and Anita's counsel got paid \$5,000 before. So, I sort of assumed - that was different counsel - and rather than the objections, I sort of assumed we were all going to be working in some cooperative spirit for something that was helpful but wasn't doing everything because obviously then you're determining the case but determine the case. I get that. But I don't think there is any

question that there are five siblings here who are going to end up with trust assets at the end of the day. And so, you know, you can, you can hope for things to be agreed upon or worked out. That doesn't mean that happens. But I certainly think that there is a middle ground there considering the assets in the trust that -- the Iowa farm is worth in excess of \$2 million. So, it's also not liquid, but there are liquid assets in the trust.

But, you know, the Iowa farm is kind of the curse and the blessing in the case. It can't go anywhere so it's preserved, but it's also not liquid.

And because there are some other liquid assets, you know, minimal distributions, even if it's two off the beneficiaries, would be helpful in that regard in moving the case toward a resolution as opposed to what else can we fight about?

THE COURT: I think that's a good point too. I think it would make it more possible to make -- rather than make it, obviously, to pay attorney fees, but just simply distributions to all five beneficiaries in equal amounts. I mean, of course, we would absolutely be open to something like that, and that would enable the beneficiaries to fund, you know, any -- or pursue the causes of action that they -- to defend

the cause of action that result from all this.

MR. OSTROM: Your Honor, and to your point, we agreed to the payment of attorneys fees for their counsel, previously. That was an order that Judge Hoyt entered. And so, I've done that in the past.

When we filed our application for our motion for payment of attorneys fees, the trustees were not represented. It was just Anita. And I fully expected that we would get down here, and we could attempt to work out a deal because if Anita's complying with this temporary injunction, her attorneys aren't getting paid either. And the same should be true for Amy, that I don't believe any one client has a whole bunch of expendable resources outside of the trust to pay the attorneys fees.

So, I would be willing to work out an agreement in that regard as well, but we are met with objections like Ms. Bayless said.

THE COURT: Well, I'm just not, I'm not -I just don't feel like I can -- I don't feel like that,
under the terms of the trust and pursuant to the terms
of the trust, I can allow attorney fees to be paid at
this time. I think I could absolutely make a
distribution to all five beneficiaries if everyone
agreed to that. And to me, that seems like the most

plausible solution to this rather than talk about attorney fees at all.

I mean, make a distribution and let each beneficiary decide whether that's a good use of their money to spend on the litigation, to spend that distribution on litigation.

MR. OSTROM: And, Your Honor, not opposed to that. What I don't know is that we have all the information we need right today because we came at this from the attorney fee angle. I don't know what that looks like, like what would be a fair partial distribution. 'Cause what we're talking about, in essence, would be a partial distribution out of the trust, and what that partial distribution looked like, what assets we would pick from, how much income is thrown off from the Iowa farm. There's some issues that counsel and I would have to work through if we are going to get to that resolution today.

#### COURT'S RULING

THE COURT: I'm not asking you to get to a resolution. I'm just saying, I don't feel comfortable awarding attorney fees at this time -- or that's not really the right language, but allowing the trustees to make a distribution for the purpose of paying attorney fees; however, if -- I'm just trying to soften that

blow, Mr. Ostrom, by saying if you guys present to me an agreed order that sets out a plan for a partial distribution, I would absolutely be open to that.

That's, that's all I'm saying.

MR. OSTROM: Okay. Thank you.

THE COURT: So, I think that we can get to where your clients need to be, easily, if you can all agree to a partial distribution.

MR. OSTROM: Okay.

THE COURT: But I don't know what the assets are. I don't know what the liquidity is. I mean, I'm flying blind, and so that's why you guys will have to work on that without me and then present it.

MR. OSTROM: So, is it safe to say that my request for attorney's fees is denied at this time? It sounds like that's where we're at.

THE COURT: I mean, it is. I hate to say that because I'm so sympathetic to your problem and your client's problem; but on the other hand, you know, I've got, you know, Mom and Dad on my shoulder telling me, through this restatement of trust, I can't do it as much as I want to, you know. I can feel sympathy all day long, but the terms of the trust don't allow me to go there. But I am telling you where the trust terms allow me to go and that's in the direction of allowing a

partial distribution.

MR. OSTROM: Okay. Very good, Your Honor.

MS. SMITH: Do you mind if I speak because

I got dragged down here on an attorneys fees motion?

THE COURT: Sure.

### ARGUMENT BY MS. SMITH:

MS. SMITH: My client, Carole, who doesn't get mentioned and always gets left out, has had to sit in court, in Judge Hoyt's court, not being a party but coming to observe, and she has had to watch, as Candace, who you have sympathy for but shouldn't, pro se, would stand up at the stand. And when you get the file, you will understand my frustration. And I apologize for anything that was sidebar, but I've had to sit and watch this and watch what has happened to Carole through a very non-sympathetic Candy.

She filed this in federal court. She has literally cost the trust, through this ridiculous cause of action, more money than the master's report found was even irregular.

Judge Hoyt is a very nice man. I had never seen him before. I'm a probate lawyer. I don't find myself in that jurisdiction. She would stand at the podium and read DTPA pleadings for hours on end. And my client, Carole, would sit there realizing, at

some point in life, she would have to be paying for stuff Candace's boyfriend wrote. It was horrible. It was a nightmare to be there.

So, at some point, Judge Hoyt, who had had enough, and I can't say anything because if I make an appearance for Carole, she's paying attorney's fees in federal court and for the pleasure of getting sued by her brother in this court. So, I just have to sit there and watch. And at some point Judge Hoyt said, "I'm done. Find a lawyer."

Never happened.

We have these resets and these resets and these resets and these resets. "Find a lawyer."

And at one point she comes and says, "I don't have any money to pay a retainer."

So, for Mr. Ostrom to come in your court and say the ridiculous statement that some pattern had been set by Judge Hoyt, he just wanted this woman to stop reading at a fast pace that his court reporter could probably, at sometimes, not even keep up with this diatribe. And all the while, me and my client are sitting in the back going, "Oh, my gosh. You have to pay for this."

And then she gets this master appointment who, again, I'm sure was a very nice person. It would

have been really nice if they had a probate auditor's idea of what a trust should look like or what an accounting should look like, but it cost, again, my client, Carole, being one of the beneficiaries, an arm and a leg. It was awful. And at the end of the day, the bill would choke a goat. It was horrid. And I kept thinking to myself, I'm not in this. I would come to every third or fourth hearing just to see what was going on. And I was watching my client's inheritance slipping away due to Candace's frivolous and just-crazy proceeding.

Now, am I saying that Amy and Anita have been perfect trustees? I never got to see the master's report, so I don't know. I have no idea. I do know that what part of it, I did get from Maureen McCutchen, the prior, a statement of what went on - is that we spent more in litigation costs and fees and paying him than the irregularities by -- and I don't know that to be true. So, I don't want to make a mistake to this Court 'cause I don't have it. I don't have the report that was so expensive that I had to sit down when Judge Hoyt announced how much this man was going to be paid. I've never been so shocked in my life. I've had receivers that have run businesses on less money than this cost.

And so, to say that you're sympathetic - I know you don't know the case - but I promise, Carole has no sympathy. And she just sees her inheritance draining away while to try to pay me, unbeknownst to me, she's selling a horse she loves just to try to pay part of her attorney's fees. So, I don't have any sympathy.

So, if you're looking to me for an agreement on a partial distribution, you're not going to get it.

And then we go to the case that's in this court.

My client, without counsel, drug all of her power of attorney stuff and said, "I'm here. I don't need a lawyer. Let me out. Here's all the stuff. Look at it. Take it. Do whatever you want." And they still won't let her go. And I can't even get the executor to go file a missing bonds report after he's been appointed for a gazillion years just to get the final hopeful little inkling so they might release her.

So, if you're looking for sympathy from me or any agreement from me, I feel like my client's head has been stomped on, and she gets to sit in the back corner and ignored.

Notice, nobody said anything about what was important for her. It's all about paying somebody

else's attorney's fees while she sits back there and watches what her mom and dad worked so hard for in a case she's not involved in. And I've warned her: "You get in - you're stuck with this crazy woman reading all this stuff, and you're going to have to pay me to sit there and argue it."

And then with the injunction she got in place, just to pay taxes of \$300, cost attorneys fees of a thousand. I'm not talking about me. I wasn't in it. So, to pay \$300 costs a thousand dollars.

So, I know I should not have spoken out of turn, and I'm sorry, but I am really pissed. And I'm just beyond angry that we're still doing this. I don't believe either one of their clients went to mediation in good faith. At all. I only wish I could have gotten the mediator to cite so that we might have gotten some sanctions for it. But my client is the person who sat in the back and sits there and watches her whole inheritance being spent.

So, if you think I'm going to be sympathetic to a distribution so they can pay hundreds of thousands of attorneys fees, I'm not.

Thank you.

THE COURT: Well, in response to that, I mean, you painted a pretty ugly picture of what happened

over in federal court, and I don't want that to happen here. And so to me, that's just -- to me that's one more argument to make sure that Candace is represented by an attorney here because she can, honestly, she can pursue her case pro se here because she's not, she's not acting as a fiduciary. And so that just is one more reason why a partial distribution might be a good idea because with her represented by counsel, it will -- you presumably save everyone some time.

But, number two, and I'm not trying to argue at all - I'm just trying to bring you guys to the table and realize how a partial distribution might be beneficial for everyone.

And the second reason why it might be beneficial to Carole is that, you know, she's worried that her inheritance would be fettered away with attorney fees. And if she can receive a partial distribution that she doesn't have to pay out to attorney fees, at least she can start preserving those distributions. And she's getting, you know, something meaningful, whereas, you know, if this continues for five years, there may be nothing left.

So, those are two arguments in favor of that, you know, that might cause Carole to agree to a partial distribution. Perhaps, I don't know, but I

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don't feel like that -- and I'm not necessarily
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   sympathetic to any of the parties - I'm sympathetic,
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   honestly, to the attorneys. I mean, I've been in Mr.
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   Ostrom's shoes where I needed to pursue something that
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   was, you know, what I felt was a good transaction, and I
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   wasn't getting paid. So, those are my thoughts.
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                  I've already ruled. And I just wish you
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   guys the best in pursuing some other avenues for
    solutions.
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                  MS. SMITH:
                              Thank you.
                  MR. OSTROM: Thank you, Your Honor.
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                  THE COURT: Does anyone have a proposed
    order on this?
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                  MR. FEATHERSTON: I do.
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                  MR. OSTROM: I have no objections.
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                  MS. SMITH: It's fine.
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                  MS. SPIELMAN: No objection.
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   County of Harris
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